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ANTIMARKETS, CONSUMPTION, AND EMPOWERMENT
INTRODUCTION
Buying and selling more and more shapes what we are, which leads
to the gangsterization of this society-of getting materials by any
means necessary.'
Thinking of American ghettoes as sites of consumption
may seem as unlikely as giving legal specificity to the over-
worn term "empowerment;" yet both form the thesis of this
Article. The law's growing interest in inner-city economic de-
velopment has forced a recognition that these persistently poor
neighborhoods must be compared to middle-class urban com-
munities. Further, the creation and maintenance of both are
closely related in law to land use planning and public finance.
In a related article,2 I described a legal framework that pro-
vides a better understanding of ghetto underdevelopment and
suggests interventions relevant to those structural aspects of
what some call community empowerment theory and practice.
A remaining problem, however, is the legal rootlessness of
"empowerment" goals, together with the failure to consider
their origins in consumption and the corresponding importance
of law reforms consistent with consumer principles.
As much as the places where we live and work, consump-
tion organizes our priorities, contributes to our notions of per-
sonal identity, and characterizes the relative well-being of our
communities. It refigures real time into nanosecond acquisi-
tion-such as twenty-four hour stock trades anywhere,3 home
delivery of every conceivable consumer good 4 -and even in-
vites the lucrative commodification of ourselves5 and the plac-
1 Rosalind Cummings, Channeling Rage: A Black Scholar Offers His Vision of
Priorities in Healing Racism, CHIcAGO TRIBUNE, May 20, 1993, at 3 (quoting Pro-
fessor Cornel West).
2 See David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket
Dichotomy and the Legal Challenges of Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 427 (Summer 2000) [hereinafter Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy].
3 See, e.g., E-trade.com <http//www.E-trade.com>.
Kozmo.com, for example, a New York City-based business, offers consumers
home delivery of virtually any imagineable item, including junk food, music, vid-
eos, and clothing. See Kozmo.com <http:J/www.kozmo.com>.
' See generally White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.
1992) (The Ninth Circuifs somewhat controversial decision affirming game-show
celebrity Vanna White's claims asserting that an advertiser's unlicensed use of a
robot merely dressed like her that flipped game-show letters constituted her "iden-
tity" in violation of her right of publicity).
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es to which we belong.6 We consume private goods and servic-
es and are consumed by them. We consume intangibles such as
protection, privacy, and closeness to community, freeing us if
they can from being consumed by danger, exposure, or isola-
tion. In this Article, I describe the typical site of these norma-
tive consumption activities as the middle-class "metamarket,"7
the neighborhoods in which layers of markets coalesce in the
consumer imagination to provide economic stability sustained
largely by private legal ordering and public law sanction.'
Despite the metamarket's relevance to any notion of eco-
nomic empowerment, this Article re-focuses these place-based
consumer interactions on the inner-city poor and the ghetto
neighborhoods-that I call "antimarkets"--where the poor
struggle for economic inclusion and against marginalization.
Antimarkets are places of negation where the rules and prefer-
ences of middle-class life are suspended or denied and the
landscape has been systematically impoverished of the private
and public resources that sustain economic stability and create
wealth. Thus, they are distinguishable from metamarket
neighborhoods not merely by demographics and history but
also by the character and mode of consumption that regularly
occurs within each. Clearly, there are aspects of consumption
that easily threaten the goal of economic empowerment in
ghetto communities, and there are many aspects of a middle-
class model of consumption that are simply inappropriate, if
6 See Sam Howe Verhovek, City Weighs Price of Its Good Name; Company
Wants to Pay Dot on Map to Use Its Dot Corn Label, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 2000, at
A12 (Halfway, Oregon, population 362, decides whether to change its name to
Half.com for the year 2000 following an offer from Internet start-up company).
' See Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy, supra note 2, at 434-54. See also discussion
infra Part I.A.1.
" This observation should not imply endorsement of the claims that public law
theorists sometimes make about the efficiencies of communities in which the lines
between public and private goods acquisition are blurred in favor of individualized
consumer choice. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expendi-
tures 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (collapsing citizens into "consumer-voters" whose
power of exit, like the power to shop, forces municipalities to compete for
desireable residents). However, I do embrace the notion that land use law has
facilitated stability for households and local markets. Although the deprivation of
land use controls simultaneously defined ghetto antimarkets, land use principles of
democratic participation in community decisionmaking, exclusion of certain market-
eroding land usages, and comprehensive planning, all supported by important
public financing of municipal services and amenities, retain their utility among
contemporary strategies for the economic empowerment of antimarkets.
[Vol. 66: 1
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not deeply problematic. The first objective of this ongoing pro-
ject is to identify those structural elements that differentiate
metamarket from antimarket consumption and, relatedly, to
identify legal principles of consumption that may empower
profoundly weakened neighborhoods.
However, my thesis turns on two additional distinctions,
the second of which might be stated as an irony: Can a legal
norm of economic empowerment rely upon consumer law prin-
ciples that themselves reflect, if not govern, the same con-
sumption patterns that sustain racial and economic
marginalization in the first place? This question arises from
the distinction between consumer protection laws as we know
them and consumer protections relevant to what economically
disempowered communities need. Increased consumerism both
inside and outside antimarkets makes unavoidable a reliance
upon some articulation of consumption dynamics in the context
of existing consumer law.
This is not a concession. Excesses aside, poor people and
their inner-city neighborhoods are consumers of basic public
and private goods and services in ways very similar to middle-
income people and their urban communities, despite critical
differences. Moreover, even the most vague notions of economic
empowerment are founded upon assumptions of consumer
need, choice and the exercise of personal economic autonomy.
The difficulties lie in how we define consumers and consump-
tion and what fairly may be regarded as empowering. Consum-
er law, however, is generally a narrow domain-to the extent
that it even appears viable today. Although federal and state
consumer protection statutes abound9 and much intellectual
property and unfair competition laws include obligatory nods
to consumer interests,0 legislation, litigation, and legal schol-
arship about the needs and rights of consumers have failed to
advance much beyond the heyday of the 1970s.1" Most of
these laws and their rationales are concerned with either prod-
See discussion infra Part II.
10 For example, prevention of fraud and deception of consumers is among the
interests protected by the Lanham Act's false designation of origin provisions. See
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126 (2d
Cir. 1979) (holding raincoat trademarks not to be confusingly similar).
" Indeed, many legal writers implicitly characterize the 1970s as the beginning
and end of governmental consumer protection.
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uct safety or the fairness of specific terms in an individual
transaction (e.g., applications for credit), whether they have
been represented in a fair and non-deceptive fashion or should
have been disclosed at all.' These undoubtedly have some
application to antimarket economies. Yet beyond incorporating
contract doctrines such as unconscionability, there is very little
consumer law that recognizes the aggregate peculiarities and
deprivations of low-income consumers, whether they are indi-
viduals or parts of a city. Unfortunately, legal scholarship
about poor consumers is sparse, dated, 3 or, at best, only
hopeful.'
4
Meanwhile, individuals and neighborhoods consume, for
good or for bad, in ways and on terms that signal their status
relative to empowerment. This Article takes the position that
much consumption in antimarket communities is both counter-
productive and unfair, but may still be the basis for transfor-
mation to economic empowerment. Current modes of
antimarket consumption often recycle marginalization, dispos-
sessing neighborhoods populated largely by people of color of
economic benefits enjoyed by the surrounding city and metro-
politan areas of which they are an isolated part. This is a prob-
lem with strong cultural implications for any legal norm of
empowerment. It raises the third and final distinction ad-
dressed by this analysis: that there is such a thing as benefi-
cial consumption on one hand (e.g., the necessary acquisition of
goods and services) and consumerism on the other (e.g., the
excessive acquisition of more than we need or can afford).
Though everywhere apparent, this distinction is perhaps more
complicated in antimarkets, not because conspicuous consum-
erism is more prevalent there than in metamarkets, but be-
2 Even a well-known consumer protection provision in the regulation of securi-
ties that prohibits insider trading, Rule 10b-5, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5,
focuses litigants on the facts surrounding a specific transaction. See discussion
infra Part IV.
" For instance, one of a few comprehensive sources was published as the War
on Poverty was being launched. See generally THE LAW AND THE LOW-INCOME
CONSUMER (Carol Hecht Katz ed., 1968).
14 See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION
OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 9 (1992) (acknowledging the need for lawyers and
avocates who practice in and on behalf of poor communities to learn more about
consumer advocacy).
[Vol. 66: 1
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cause the need for economic empowerment-individual, group
and neighborhood-is so much greater and harder to realize.
The following hypothetical illustrates some characteristics
of these three distinctions-metanarket vs. antimarket con-
sumption, legally recognized consumer protections vs. economic
empowerment norms, and consumerism vs. beneficial consump-
tion. Here are three deliberately stereotyped consumers joined
yet divided in place: Lucille, Aaki, and Shawna. Lucille is the
lessee of a woman's hair salon near, but not on, the main com-
mercial strip of 125th Street in Harlem. Aaki is a single moth-
er of two on welfare, but trying to work her way off by braiding
and styling hair in one of eight booths Lucille rents for $150
per week." There is no contract between them. 6 Though the
small shop is in a federal empowerment zone, Lucille has not
been in business long enough to qualify for a microenterprise
loan,' nor does she pay payroll taxes or social security for
any of her independent contractors. The shop is poorly heated
and ventilated, may not meet building codes for cleanliness
and fire hazards, carries no hazard insurance, and none of the
hairdressers like Aaki have licenses. In contrast to Lucille and
Aaki, Shawna is not a Harlem resident, but a downtown law-
yer who every three weeks spends six to eight hours on a Sat-
urday having her hair braided by Aaki at a cost of about
$100.18 Lucille has overhead costs of about $2,000 per month
and collects $4,800 per month rent from independent contrac-
tors like Aaki. Aaki in turn nets about $1,200 per month, after
covering rent and supplies, for an annual income of $14,400.
Since nearly all transactions are "off the books," Aaki's wages
represent poverty-level income that at least goes untaxed. 19
15 For a stimulating analysis of the cultural dimensions embedded in black
women's decisions about hair styles, see Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Per-
spectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365.
16 See discussion infra Part III.
17 Even in a federal empowerment zone, smaller businesses without a three-
year track record may be disqualified from commercial loans. See Abby Ellin, A
Harlem Power Zone Weakens Some, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 4, 2000, at B4.
" Less labor-intensive hair styles average $60 and take about three to four
hours.
"' According to poverty guidelines issued by the Department of Health and
Human Services, the poverty level for a family of three in March, 1999, was
$13,880. See Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (visited
Sept. 9, 2000) <http'J/aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/qqpoverty.htm>.
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The problems begin with the incentives to cheat based on
not easily reconcilable antagonisms built into the relationships.
Lucille terminates independent contractors who fail to keep
enough appointments, object to the rent, refuse to pay occa-
sional increases, or who she suspects are trying to lure cus-
tomers to their homes instead. Aaki believes she is being
ripped off on the rent price, that the work environment is
cramped and unsafe, and that she has no protection against
slow times or abuse. As soon as she can, she vows to get out,
after which Lucille will easily replace her with one of countless
women in similar straits with similar skills. Shawna dislikes
the physical characteristics of the setting, thinks the operation
is too haphazard and time consuming, resents being separately
charged for every item used on her, but knows that the more
up-scale shops downtown will charge three times as much for
the same service.
These three women are all consumers in the antimarket,
although Shawna's presence there as a visitor from a
metamarket neighborhhood is voluntary, yet critical. Structur-
al and personal factors put each at risk. Though a landlord to
the hairbraiders, Lucille is a consumer of commercial space,
utilities, the provision of whatever public infrastructure that
makes 125th Street a viable place to open a store (e.g., public
transportation, sanitation, street maintenance, etc.), as well as
a residential consumer of locally available goods and services.
Aaki is also a consumer of services; further, she consumes
public and informal social services for herself and her family
(e.g., schools, day care, public medical care) and job supplies.
Shawna is a more traditional consumer of hair care services. A
fire, inspection, or robbery could ruin everything for everyone;
greater deterioration of local public services could keep custom-
ers like Shawna away, first effecting Aaki and eventually crip-
pling Lucille. Lucille is at risk simply if she is audited. Aaki is
at risk if she ever needed to challenge the legality of her em-
ployment terms. Shawna would have little or no recourse if she
were injured getting her hair done.
Finally, the area in which these transactions and relation-
ships occur-Harlem, Central Harlem, the 125th Street com-
mercial strip, however it should be defined meaningfully-is
also a consumer. The area consumes aggregate public goods
and services used up by its businesses and residents, such as
[Vol. 66: 1
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zoning protections (or the lack thereof), fire, police, traffic,
sanitation (or the lack thereof), and the allocation of benefits,
amenities, and subsidies through the political process (or the
lack thereof). Harlem, if we call it the geographic consumer
here, stands in a different position relative to other parts of
the same city with which it competes for municipal services,
regulatory attention, state and federal subsidies, businesses,
and so forth. Further, as an antimarket, it has necessarily
experienced substantial disinvestment and redlining," which
in turn negatively impacts the options available to consumers
there. The differences, then, correspond to differences in the
experiences of local consumers such as Lucille, Aaki, and
Shawna.
The arrangement is thus precarious for everyone and high-
lights myriad features of the three distinctions that guide us
toward a norm of legal empowerment. First, consumption in
the antimarket sediments a vulnerability that limits consumer
agency and prospects for sustained economic stability. There
are few formal or legally enforceable rules, questionable terms,
underinsurance, limited investment capital amid hand-to-
mouth small businesses, and a local labor force whose limited
skills, education, and work experience reflect salient facts in
the feminization of poverty and the preponderance of low-pay-
ing, no-mobility service sector work.2'
Second, existing consumer protections are largely unavail-
able to the four consumers-including Harlem--either because
they fail to reach these types of transactional deficiencies, cost
" See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
21 See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 39-43 (1987). These are also salient factors
in the lives of many underpaid, unprotected workers in the informal wage econo-
my, many (if not most) of whom are immigrants. For in-depth analyses of these
and related issues, see generally Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable
Immigrant Workforce and the Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation,
103 YALE L.J. 2179 (1994); Jennifer Gordon, We Make The Road By Walking:
Immigrant Workers, The Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995); Laura Ho et al., (Dis)Assembling Rights of
Women Workers Along the Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment
Industry, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383 (1996); Saskia Sassen, The Informal
Economy: Between New Developments and Old Regulations, 103 YALE L.J. 2289
(1994); Leo L. Lam, Note, Designer Duty: Extending Liability to Manufacturers for
Violations of Labor Standards in Garment Industry Sweatshops, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 623 (1992).
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too much to pursue through individual litigation, or the defi-
ciencies themselves are collective and pre-contractual (e.g., the
area effects of redlining), putting them beyond the reach of
established legal claims.
Third, and into a cultural thicket, is the matter of benefi-
cial consumption versus consumerism. The centrality of hair
care among black consumers, like the ingestion of fast food by
most Americans, is culturally complicated and beyond question
here. However, whether its meaning is limited to highly indi-
vidualistic style preferences or expanded into a comprehensive
map of potentially empowering commerce in antimarkets may
determine whether a hair salon is just a hair salon or a cultur-
ally rich source of wealth-creating relationships.22 The per-
haps subtle point is that, beyond appearances, many of the
basic formal and informal exchanges in antimarkets that cur-
rently implicate only self-interested consumerism may be
transformed into economically empowering consumption.
But that is ultimately a legal praxis question dependent
first upon an articulation of what the empowerment norm
means in law. My analysis builds upon the three distinctions.
Part I reviews the ingredients and mechanics of the
metamarket/antimarket dichotomy, focusing on the different
content and meaning of the collective consumption patterns of
each. Part II then analyzes a limited array of relevant consum-
er laws and related legal principles toward an understanding
of their application to a legal norm of empowerment. Conclud-
ing that current consumer protection laws are not well de-
signed for empowerment, I deduce from them three principles
that are applicable to a norm of economic empowerment: dis-
closure, equality, and fairness. Missing, however, are access,
accommodation, and remediation. Combined, these principles
help to define the legal norm of economic empowerment as a
condition of agency capable of bringing about self-support,
stability, and growth throtigh the ownership and control of
economic resources. Part III analyzes that norm within prevail-
ing pronouncements of economic empowerment and the prob-
lematic distinction between consumerism and beneficial con-
sumption. I recommend a third possibility, which I demon-
2 See generally Caldwell, supra note 15.
[Vol. 66: 1
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strate in Part IV through two examples: lawyering for consum-
er education and a hypothetical model for investment called
"The Community Unit Investment Trust."
I. THE FIRST DISTINCTION: METAMARKETS, ANTIMARKETS
AND COMMUNITY CONSUMPrION
A. The Creation and Character of Metamarket and
Antimarket Communities
In comparative context, the antimarket is the otherness to
economic places of autonomy and vitality in the city. It is the
place of anti-norm activity and identity, just as the middle-
class metamarket is the site of normality.23 In isolation,
however, we understand the antimarket as a post-industrial
ghetto characterized by high rates of joblessness, family dislo-
cation, infant mortality, crime and drug abuse,24 housing in-
stability and vulnerability to displacement,25 minimal, but
expensive, capital26 and extremely limited personal wealth
holdings,27 high prices for low-quality consumer goods routine-
ly offered through informal or underground market activity,"
unconventional and expensive lending sources and banking
surrogates," poor public services and institutions," virtual
political irrelevance,3' and isolation from information net-
See Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy, supra note 2, at 448-50.
24 See WILSON, supra note 21, at 20-29.
See Michelle Adams, Separate and Unequal: Housing Choice, Mobility, and
Equalization in the Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. REV. 413,
424-30 (1996).
2 See Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empow-
erment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Ra-
cial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (1994).
2? See generally MICHAEL SHERRADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICAN
WELFARE POLICY (1991) (analyzing data on asset trends among U.S. poor).
28 See generally Arthur J. Jacobson, Symposium: The Informal Economy: The
Other Path of the Law, 103 Yale L.J. 2213 (1994).
2 See David Dante Troutt, How the Poor Still Pay More, in THE THIN RED
LINE: How THE POOR STILL PAY MORE 62-70 (1994) [hereinafter Troutt, Poor Pay
More].
2" See Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to
Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 754
(1993).
31 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 453 (1990).
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works amid the concentration effects of persistent household
poverty." The antimarket is primarily black, yet often Latino.
The purpose of a metamarket/antimarket dichotomy, how-
ever, is to replace the analytical limitations of an isolated per-
spective of the ghetto with a descriptive paradigm that re-posi-
tions it alongside middle-class neighborhoods within the city as
a whole. It is impossible to explore consumption outside a
comparative context and even harder to posit a legal norm of
empowerment without evaluating the dynamic by which some
communities and their consumers are empowered by certain
modes of beneficial consumption. Therefore, this Section begins
with a brief overview of how the law followed governmental
and private actors in creating the metamarket and its func-
tional antithesis, the ghetto antimarket. The analysis revolves
primarily around land and land use law because, prior to the
stable entrenchment of a current consumerism, the spaces
within the urban metropolis had to be rationally ordered and
segregated.3
1. Making Metamarkets
Central to the claim of the contemporary metamarket's
normalcy is the assertion that land use law and policy begin-
ning in the early twentieth century was (and remains) de-
signed to facilitate the stability of middle-class "ideal" struc-
tures.34 The primary, but not exclusive, land use planning
device was zoning, whose goals of segregating spaces within
the city on the grounds of state-delegated police power and
local democratic decisionmaking were endorsed most emphati-
cally in the seminal case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Real-
ty.3" In Euclid and many subsequent state cases,36 courts
32 This is a term fairly attributable to sociologist William Julius Wilson's thesis
regarding the cumulative layering of disadvantage that occurs in areas populated
disproportionately by households in extreme poverty. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note
21, at 58.
See generally M. CHRISTINE BOYER, DREAMING THE RATIONAL CITY: THE
MYTH OF AMERICAN CITY PLANNING (1983) (deconstructing the history of the urban
planning movement in U.S. cities before and after the turn of the century).
" Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy, supra note 2, at 434-36.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
36 See, e.g., Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 64 A.2d
347, 350 (N.7. 1949) (taking judicial notice of facts showing concrete mixing at
[Vol. 66: 1
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were not only sanctioning the urban planning movement's
efforts to rationally organize rapidly developing polyglot conflu-
ences of commerce, industry, and class-stratified residential ar-
eas, they were also re-ifying the shape and pattern of ideals
associated with the American middle-class "good life." These
ideals or, more broadly, ideal structures, included the prefer-
ence for single-family detached dwellings and against rental
housing,37 community control over the character and aesthetic
feel of residential areas where families raised children, 8 and
comprehensive planning for convenience amenities, such as
household goods and services and recreation facilities, but
against noxious or undesirable uses, such as factories. 9 All of
these ideals were enshrined by judicial decisions that pressed a
particular model of order and stability, whose obvious and
necessary goods were defined (if indirectly) by the people them-
selves." The bottom-line objective of these ideals working to-
gether with law and other institutions of the public and pri-
vate sectors was (and is) the preservation and growth of prop-
erty values-that is, community and individual wealth accu-
mulation.41 The primary norm underlying these decades-long
developments was exclusion-physical, economic, ethnic, and,
most importantly, racial.42
issue in residential town could be performed more suitably in other nearby mu-
nicipalities); Flora Realty and Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 1036
(1952) ("Any intrusion of smaller lots into such an area will have the effect of
materially impairing the value of the buildings already constructed .... The
zoning ordinance has tended to stabilize and preserve the value of the property in
the several districts."); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 109, 341
N.E.2d 236, 241, 379 N.Y.S.2d 672, 680 (1975) ("The primary goal of a zoning
ordinance must be to provide for the development of a balanced, cohesive commu-
nity which will make efficient use of the town's available land.").
See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-95; see also generally Edward H. Ziegler, Jr.,
The Twilight of Single-Family Zoning, 3 J. OF ENVTL. L. 161 (1983).
See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S 1, 9 (1974).
3 See Dubin, supra note 30, at 746.
See, e.g., Duffcon, 64 A.2d at 350 (total exclusion of industry); Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 89 A.2d 693, 697 (N.J. 1952) (minimum residen-
tial floor space requirements).
" See generally Charles M. Haar, The Twilight of Land-Use Controls: A Para-
digm Shift, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011 (1996).
2 Advocating a cultural or anthropological reading of space in modern society,
David Sibley describes these facets of exclusion as "mapping."
There is a history of imaginary geographies that cast minorities,
"imperfect" people, and a list of others who are seen to pose a threat to
the dominant group in society as polluting bodies or folk devils who are
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My characterization of the now-ordinary results of these
processes as metamarkets reflects and rejects the now-ordinary
assumption that these outcomes were produced by free market
forces. That cannot be so, despite occasional exhortations to
the contrary. Whatever impetus set these trends in mo-
tion-the real estate industry, local commercial elites, the will
of the people acting through governmental decisionmaking, or
the will of the people acting through voluntary organiza-
tions-their maintenance could not be achieved without regula-
tory intervention. Indeed, zoning regulation itself is interven-
tion in free markets.43 But the economic resources available to
realize metamarket ideals came from both public and private
sources. For every dollar of wealth accumulated through pri-
vate ordering, such as racially restrictive covenants or the vigi-
lance of homeowner associations,' countless more are owed to
judicial decisions upholding discriminatory planning rules,"
the convergence of racially discriminatory federal lending
guidelines created by the real estate lobby,46 or the segregative
and dislocating effects of federal-local governmental policies,
such as urban renewal" or the siting and administration of
public housing.4" Far from a free market, these forces com-
bined to limit the opportunities of many Americans in order to
promote the welfare first of the wealthy and soon after of a
burgeoning, overwhelmingly white middle class.49 The "mar-
kets" that these consumers sought and found, therefore, reflect
then located 'elsewhere' .. . . Thus, values associated with conformity or
authoritarianism are expressed in maps that relegate others to places
distant from the locales of the dominant majority.
See DAVID SIBLEY, GEOGRAPHIES OF EXCLUSION 49 (1995).
' See Haar, supra note 41, at 1019.
44 See generally EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND
THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994).
See Dubin, supra note 30, at 749-56 (discussing cases).
46 See MCKENZIE, supra note 44, at 22, 27, 63 (discussing the Homeowner Loan
Association Underwriting Manual and its influence on discriminatory lending
guidelines promulgated by the Federal Housing Administration).
47 See generally MARTIN ANDERSEN, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER (1964).
41 See generally Gerald E. Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1047 (1996); Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of
Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U.
PENN. L. REv. 1285 (1995).
"' See, e.g., Peter Abeles, Planning and Zoning, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN
DREAM 134 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds. 1989) (describing zoning as
primarily a middle-class framework).
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a variety of public and private interventions to secure the sta-
bility of psychological and cultural notions of the self expressed
through both the landscape and the opportunities it could
facilitate." Hence, they are more than neighborhood markets;
they are "metamarkets" of an exclusive American dream con-
sumed by and benefiting many.
Equally important to an understanding of metamarkets for
the purposes of legal strategies in inner-city economic develop-
ment is the identification of what kind of law is now relevant
there. In contrast to antimarkets, discussed below,
metamarkets are places governed mainly by private ordering
and commercial transactions. 2 This point is made more stark
in Part II, where established principles of consumer law dem-
onstrate the primacy of private law even in attempting regula-
tion.53 When we think of middle-class neighborhoods and the
laws that predominate there, we are steeped in a world of
condo and home sales financing, over-the-counter purchases,
and a host of intangible necessaries, such as insurance avail-
ability. These are classic categories of consumption. However,
even when we view the non-private, public finance related
legal activity in metamarket places-the property tax basis for
school financing, the provision of highways, public transporta-
tion, sanitation, and other public services-we see a similar
consumption dynamic. As Charles Tiebout long ago indicated,
the middle class effectively exercises its power to exit as con-
sumer leverage over public and private goods and services.54
2. Making Antimarkets
Nothing could be more different in ghettoes, which is the
starting point to recognizing them as antimarkets. Consumer
power over public and private goods and services is severely
limited for persistently poor people isolated in poor places. Exit
is not available for renter families in need of affordable hous-
"' See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text; cf. Richard Thompson Ford,
The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1841, 1858 (1994) (describing this result as "the political geography of space").
51 See Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy, supra note 2, at 477-78.
52 See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part II.
5' See generally Tiebout, supra note 8.
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ing and mired in joblessness, concentrations of resource-poor
households around them, and physical environments devoid of
land use planning reflective of local decisionmaking. Many
scholars persuasively ascribe both dejure and de facto segrega-
tion dynamics to the ghetto's lack of community control, invest-
ment capital, and unregulated, unstable environments for
families with children." Although the analytic power of these
studies is beyond dispute, legal analyses concerned with eco-
nomic empowerment demand comparisons to metamarkets.
Rational planning and the wealth- and citizenship-enhanc-
ing attributes of zoning never inured to ghettoes, the reposito-
ries of metamarket negation, which ensured their vulnerability
as excluded places. Generally, poorer, predominantly black
neighborhoods of American cities were indeed zoned (often
overzoned), but not with the implicit objective of stabilizing
social and economic outcomes for local families. 6 Rather, zon-
ing came to the ghetto to facilitate industrial and commercial
interests or, as in so much of urban renewal and even contem-
porary urban redevelopment, to clear space attractive to mid-
dle-class professionals and their "good ratables."57 Deliberate
redlining by banks in collusion with the federal government
effectively subordinated the hopes of working-class families
from homeownership and business development, which in turn
signalled risk and rejection by other geographically sensitive
commerce, such as insurance companies and retail.58 Exclud-
ed from income- and wealth-producing opportunities that were
becoming routine for most working Americans and cut off polit-
ically from influential public officials, ghetto neighborhoods
were easy targets for further destabilizing land use policies
that impeded economic development, encouraged deterioration,
and concentrated struggling families in increasingly isolated
zones of deprivation and metropolitan irrelevance.
What made most ghettoes antimarkets, then, was their
exclusion from metamarkets and the beneficial consumption of
55 See generally DOUGLASS MASSEY AND NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID
(1994).
56 See Dubin, supra note 30, at 757-64.
' See NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR., AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 293-96 (1988
Revision).
" See, e.g., City of Compton v. Bunner, 243 Cal. Rptr. 100, 106 (Cal. 1988)
(challenging insurance redlining permitted by state statute).
[Vol. 66: 1
20001 ANTIMARKETS, CONSUMPTION, AND EMPOWERMENT 17
public and private goods and services they sustain. However,
just as metamarket stability may become self-sustaining by
vigilant protection of institutional arrangements and member-
ship requirements, the character of antimarkets can become
self-executing as low-income consumers and neighborhood
vendors construct alternative ways to survive. Underground
market activity, such as drug buying and selling, is well chron-
icled as a central economic power over ghetto "markets." But
formal and informal economic activity prevalent in ghettoes
also cements antimarket status. The proliferation of check
cashing outlets, rent-to-own stores, and home repair lending
are all examples of lawful economic activity that is at least
nominally regulated pursuant to state or national require-
ments. However, because they only flourish in the absence of
banks and other more conventional (and competitive) modes of
financing, their exorbitant rates and terms often reflect more
about the marginalized commercial environment and the prof-
its available there than the risk profiles of their low-income
customers.59 Relatedly, informal economic activity, such as
day care, unlicensed personal services, and day laboring, pro-
vide many benefits to low-income consumers and workers. But
they do it without the safeguards of minimal state standards of
care, product safety oversight, or employee health benefits."
A critical point here in contrast to metamarket activity is
that economic activity in antimarkets produces for both house-
holds and their communities little stability and negligible
wealth. To the extent that economic empowerment can be
described by some combination of agency and capacity, wealth
through asset ownership is its material signifier. According to
Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro:
Wealth signifies the command over financial resources that a family
has accumulated' over its lifetime along with those resources that
have been inherited across generations .... In this sense the com-
mand over resources that wealth entails is more encompassing than
is income or education, and closer in meaning and theoretical signifi-
cance to our traditional notions of economic well-being and access to
life chances."
- See, e.g., Troutt, Poor Pay More, supra note 29, at 64-70 (describing the
relationship between banks and check cashing centers and summarizing data).
'0 See supra note 21.
6' MELVIN L. OLIVER & THmOmAs M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
The staggering disparities in wealth (e.g., net financial
assets) between blacks and whites62 as a result of the simulta-
neous development of metamarkets and antimarkets affect
economic empowerment in further ways. Michael Sherraden
concludes that the benefits of wealth include an alternative
source of support for household economic stability in the event
of an unforeseen crisis, promotion of long-term financial plan-
ning, and greater incentives to political participation.63 Most
household wealth is contained in or derives from
homeownership and the growth of property values over
time.6' As home prices doubled and tripled during the
1970s,65 people born between 1929 and 1938 accumulated
more wealth at a greater rate than other age cohorts as their
earnings accrued during the strongest periods of economic
growth.66 These homeownership opportunities were created
for some and denied to others primarily by New Deal govern-
mental lending programs and supports. In addition, as judi-
cial land use policies favoring exclusionary zoning assisted
wealth formation for millions of American families in
metamarkets, it directly marginalized those living in
antimarkets.
For poor consumers with minimal incomes, no wealth, and
little interaction with stabilizing public and private institu-
tions, the laws governing in antimarkets are unsurprisingly
public. In contrast to the private ordering that dominates legal
relationships in metamarket communities, the lives and liveli-
hoods of most antimarket consumers revolve around public law
bureaucracies (e.g., public assistance agencies, public hospitals,
and schools) and court-ordered outcomes (e.g., family and hous-
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 2 (1995).
2 For example, the authors found a critical difference between poor whites and
blacks of all income groups: the former (with incomes under $11,611 in 1987) had
a home-ownership rate of 47.3%, compared to 27.4% for poor blacks (and 40.8% for
moderate-income and 45.4% for middle-class blacks). See id. at 109. Overall, among
households with no financial assets at all in 1987, 61% were black, 54% were
Hispanic and only 25% were white. See id. at 86.
63 See SHERRADEN, supra note 27, at 149-65.
64 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 61, at 64. In 1988, for example, home
equity accounted for 43% of median household assets. Id.
See id. at 108.
See id. at 75.
67 See Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy, supra note 2, at 439-41.
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ing court decrees and criminal justice sentencing). The result-
ing quality of a life made public by dictates from without has
critical implications for how one conceives of consumption and
the sources of empowerment."
B. Contrasting Implications: The Content and Feel of
Consumption in Metamarkets and Antimarkets
1. Consumption and Consumerism in Comparative
Perspective
The above analysis gives primacy to land use law and
public finance considerations in creating the foundation for
both metamarkets and antimarkets. Though new suburban-
type communities are still being developed within and without
the boundaries of U.S. cities, 9 land use law is arguably less
central to the maintenance of metamarkets today."° In
contrast, antimarket transformation may benefit from utilizing
many of the same land-use devices that enabled metamarket
development but were denied to ghettoes during most of the
twentieth century. For example, comprehensive planning with
citizen input, re-zoning to exclude new incompatible uses and
the elimination of noxious and often hazardous facilities re-
main available as community-building interventions in
antimarket neighborhoods. Yet the limitations of built envi-
ronments within the city remain quite real, rendering land use
law an important but complementary vehicle of effective
See infra Part I.B.2.
' See Todd S. Purdom, Los Angeles Tests Its Limits in Quest to Grow, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2000, at Al, A32 (describing various housing developments in
cities throughout the northwest Los Angeles County basin, despite fears of subur-
ban sprawl and environmental erosion, and quoting County Supervisor Zev
Yaroslavsky on why single-family detached homes are sought instead of vertical
developments: "People don't want to live in skyscrapers like New York ....
[O]nce you've lived in a single-family house with your own backyard, you're basi-
cally not interested in moving back to what amounts to a Holiday Inn-like exis-
tence.").
"0 See generally Haar, supra note 41.
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advocacy.7 Therefore, how consumerism and collective con-
sumption differ between metamarkets and antimarkets is the
focus of this Section.
The term "consumerism" suggests a problem with con-
sumption; it implies that there is such a thing as good or bene-
ficial consumption and an excess beyond some reasonable
threshold. Consumers and consuming communities can some-
how go too far. Our economic indicators generally respond well
to heightened consumption, so the problem with excess must
lodge in a different place, such as the collective social effects of
personal spheres. David Sibley notes, for example, that "[wie
can see that the imperative of accumulation under capitalism
has made developed societies centres of consumption within
the global economy, and the way in which consumption is pro-
moted, the process of 'want creation'. . . contributes to purified
identities and feelings of abjection in relation to the 'other.' 72
This reading implies a problem in the sociology of spatial rela-
tions between groups, norm/anti-norm, or places, metamarket-
antimarket. But the problem may also be internal when, for
instance, consumption encourages one's withdrawal from com-
munity interests. "[Tihe never-ending invitations to consume
further the privatization of the family, which is closed off from
the outside world."73
These concerns about consumption patterns and their
meaning for community certainly implicate a broader notion of
consumption than discrete arms-lenth transactions for specific
goods or services. Yet, they still may not aptly describe the
problem of increasing consumerism. Other scholars document
consumerism quantitatively by reference to the multiplicity of
new and emerging outlets to buy more and more things. Thus,
Celia Lury notes that evidence of consumerism may be seen in
factors such as the following: increased availability and range
" This is also true of metamarket landscapes, which are more fixed in place
and now enjoy a more or less self-executing dynamic of stability that relies on
principles of exclusion and consumerism. David Sibley might amend these observa-
tions with a caveat about how those built environments themselves reinforce dis-
abling differences. "We can envision the built environment as an integral element
in the production of social life, conditioning activities and creating opportunities
according to the distribution of power in the socio-spatial system." SIBLEY, supra
note 42, at 76.
72 Id. at 77.
73 Id. at 78.
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of consumer goods, the more numerous aspects of human ex-
change available through the market (including housing and
public education), the expansion of shopping as a leisure pur-
suit, increased ways to shop (e.g., the Internet), increased
importance of the packaging and advertising of goods, and
competitive displays of credit amid the declining opprobrium of
debt.7
4
Law has no such problem with consumerism and easily
applies itself to these kinds of exchanges when they go bad.
Although consumer laws, discussed in Part II, implicitly view
consumer activity through the lens of individual transactions,
consumption relevant to how communities achieve economic
stability is much broader than that. It includes not only indi-
vidual household consumer purchases for, say, retail goods but
also a neighborhood's consumption of public services (such as
schools), 75 development subsidies (such as highway funds),76
zoning protections,77 and the like. After all, these are the in-
gredients of metamarkets that must remain either stable or
improve if the area is to retain its middle-class character.78
These are also goods and services subject to regional scarcity,
so that allocations to one area may stabilize quality-of-econom-
ic-life expectations for its businesses and residents while limit-
ing the ability of less influential areas to receive such benefits
in proportion to their needs."9 Consumption at this level of
analysis does not always conform to clear contractual arrange-
ments in which a neighborhood receives consideration for
something of value; that is, its pure transactional character is
sometimes diluted by the political competition for resources
within the state, region, or locality," putting it beyond the
reach of conventional consumer laws.
71 See CELIA LURY, CONSUMIER CULTURE 29-36 (1996).
75 See infra notes 87-91.
71 See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
7 See discussion supra Part I.A.
7' According to Professor Frug, these are also the stuff of "privatized concep-
tion[s] of city services." Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 42
(1998).
7, Id. at 40-45.
"' See Briffault, supra note 31, at 401 (describing activist local decisionmaking
among municipalities that "heightens the market-like features of interlocal rela-
tions").
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Nevertheless, this spatial aspect of consumption (neighbor-
hood consumption of both public and private goods and servic-
es) is central to any project on community economic develop-
ment. In dollar terms alone, these benefits shape the economic
landscape perhaps more than any strictly defined set of con-
sumer purchases. Determinations about which area gets what
form the bedrock of a viable consumer infrastructure81 on
which neighborhood metamarkets are built-and by which
antimarkets are marginalized.
Two examples, public goods acquisition generally and
public education specifically, demonstrate the different ways in
which metamarket and antimarket communities consume
public resources. Both are fundamentally political.
As for public goods, Sheryll Cashin has shown that "state
fiscal politics is middle class politics"82 because, when it comes
to public goods such as highway maintenance, state hospitals,
medical centers, and parks, jobs-producing general expendi-
tures are highly susceptible to the disproportionate political
influence of outer-ring suburban jurisdictions.83 The trend is
particularly acute when, because of increased decentralization
of decisionmaking authority, states enjoy discretion over bud-
getary allocations." According to Cashin:
Empirical evidence . .. suggests that, when states have discretion
regarding allocations of resources-allocations that typically recur in
the context of state budget processes-middle class suburban inter-
ests predominate and, at least on a per capita basis, urban citizens
receive a substantially smaller share of state resources .... Hence,
state political processes may be overvaluing the desires of certain
suburban jurisdictions, which wield disproportionate political influ-
ence or, alternatively, state political majorities are simply rationally
maximizing public benefits for themselves.'
'1 By "consumer infrastructures," I am referring to defined sets of basic public
and private goods and services that can be quantified and compared by and across
neighborhoods within a given city, such as health care, banking and credit servic-
es, and food shopping. For an analysis comparing the experiences of low- and
middle-income consumers in Los Angeles and Oakland, Calif., see generally Troutt,
Poor Pay More, supra note 29.
82 Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Ac-
counting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 584 (1999).
3 See id. at 584-86.
" See id. at 585.
' Id. at 585-86.
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This is consumption of scarce public goods, including those
originally intended for antimarket consumers."s
As for school finance:
[Elducation is perhaps the most important consumer good people
ever acquire, not only for themselves but also for their children.
Education is considered the road to advancement, for the poor as
well as the rich: the better the education, the better the job and, as
a result, the better the quality of life .... Education simply becomes
a product everyone acquires individually, with each family trying to
obtain the very best product it can get.'
The psychic comrnodification of education of which Jerry
Frug writes represents "products" acquired both individually
and collectively, in the spatial aggregate, and depends upon
many factors that have led at least a few state courts to recog-
nize that systems of school finance may create "an unconstitu-
tional wealth-based classification in [their] effect[s] on certain
school districts.""8 Under state districting statutes, the most
important factor is boundary location, since a substantial por-
tion of most public funding for education is based on local
property taxes. 9 The resulting disparities between education
in tax-rich versus tax-poor districts are reflected not only in
basic quantitative measures such as per-pupil expenditures but
also in the quality of educational "inputs" such as programs,
books and other resources that have incalculable effects on
learning environments."
" Regarding welfare reform under the Clinton Administration's Personal Re-
sponsibility Act, Cashin notes that "the range of activities that qualify for TANF
[Temporary Assistance to Needy Families] funding is so broad that TANF dollars
can be reallocated away from providing direct income support to welfare recipi-
ents[,] leaving welfare recipients ... particularly exposed to the preferences of
state politics in times of recession." Id. at 563.
Frug, City Services, supra note 78, at 45.
Skeen v. Minnesota, No. c7-88-1954, slip op. at 66-67 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Wright County Dec. 17, 1991), cert. granted, No. c5-92-677 (Minn. May 1, 1992).
See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) (finding that financing
systems that "make[] the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of
his parents and neighbors" violate the California constitution's equal protection
clause); Sheff v. ONeill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1289 (Conn. 1996) (holding state
districting statute violates the state constitution's prohibition of segregated
schools).
" ' See David Dormont, Separate and Unequal: School District Financing, 11
LAv AND INEQUALITY 261, 271-72 (1992).
" Id. at 281-82. These spatialized wealth-based differences do not rise to the
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In effect, a circular phenomenon evolves: The richer districts-those
in which property lots and houses are more highly valued-have
more revenue, derived from taxing land and homes, to fund their
public schools. The reputation of the schools, in turn, adds to the
value of their homes, and this, in turn, expands the tax base for
their public schools. The fact that they can levy lower taxes than the
poorer districts, but exact more money, raises values even more; and
this, again, means further funds for smaller classes and for higher
teacher salaries within their public schools.9
2. How Environments Condition Economic Access
These disparities in consumption patterns and
entitlements between metamarket and antimarket communi-
ties affect not only the structure of applicable consumer law
(as we will see in Part H) but also how consumers think about
what they and their communities deserve. As consumers,
metamarket residents clearly accept (unconsciously or not) that
certain neighborhood amenities, goods and services accrue to
middle-class status.92 Several studies of middle-class consum-
ers in the West suggest that a "consumer attitude," whose
main reference point is the market, pervades thinking about
status mobility, individualizing public life and constructing
level of federal Equal Protection violations because, as the Supreme Court held in
comparing the 12:1 disparity in per-pupil expenditures between Texas' Edgewood
and Alamo Heights school districts, education is not deemed a fundamental right
under the U.S. Constitution. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
91 JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
121 (1991). In a classic example of education as a spatialized consumer good,
Kozol describes how homebuyers in New York City's suburbs (where per-pupil
expenditures in 1987 generally doubled expenditures in city schools) study a state
compilation called "Statistical Profiles of Public School Districts"-much to the
delight of realtors. See id. at 120-21. Sadly, the inequalities between resources to
middle and low-income students is not dependent on municipal boundaries. Kozol
cites a report by the Community Service Society, which found that "[tihe poorest
districts in [New York City] get approximately 90 cents per pupil from [discretion-
ary] legislative grants, while the richest districts have been given $14 for each
pupil." Id. at 98. The report's "conspiracy of effect" that Kozol quotes suggests not
only that parents conceive of education as a consumer good but also that some
state legislatures conceive of students as consumer goods, with some worth funding
and others not worth the fiscal and political resources.
"See infra Part III.B.
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identity, the content of relationships, and the perceptions of
events through consumer activity. 3
Compared to the experience of their counterparts in
metamarket neighborhoods, the colloquialism "ghetto shop-
ping" goes to the heart of critical, legally measurable differ-
ences in the way antimarket residents assimilate consumption.
"Ghetto shopping" refers to the experience of shopping in a
retail establishment in which prices are higher for inferior
products and consumers have little or no likely recourse to a
refund, exchange, or warranty when the product goes bad. It
also refers to the common indifference, suspicion, and hostility
with which low-income customers are met in stores, public
agency offices, and hospitals;94 the routine barrier of bullet-
proof glass that separates consumers from check-cashing clerks
and the high-decibel exchange of words, which cannot easily
penetrate; the anticipation of late sanitation services that
clutters sidewalks with trash; the poor infrastructure repair
that leaves streets dark and more dangerous at night;95 and
even the wariness toward police and fire fighters."
The half-serious term "ghetto shopping" comprehends a
range of price and quality of goods disparities as well as con-
sumer expectations about credit terms, counter service, treat-
ment by service providers, and neighborhood physical mainte-
nance. More profoundly, it is further evidence of the
marginalization that low-income consumers internalize as they
exchange resources within a sparsely regulated economic envi-
ronment premised on obvious and pervasive disrespect. Unlike
middle-income urban and suburban consumers, low-income
consumers' distal relationship to public goods allocations at the
'. See Lury, supra note 74, at 49, 50, 233.
Jonathan Kozol quotes high school students of color in low-income parts of
Bronx, New York, as being well aware of what they can expect of their schools
and other public services as subordinated consumers. "'Hey, it's like a welfare
hospital! You're getting it for free,' says Alexander. 'You have no power to com-
plain.'" Kozol, supra note 91, at 105.
" See, e.g., Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1274, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 1984)
(Equal Protection challenge to history of Jim Crow services disparities).
" Cf. Baugh v. City of Milwaukee, 823 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (alleg-
ing municipal discrimination in fire and building inspections of residences in low-
income black area).
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state and federal levels makes knowledge and self-interested
advocacy of the larger needs of their antimarket communities
difficult at best."
Low-income consumers are therefore conditioned to expect
a hard time during economic exchanges, particularly within
antimarkets and even where the acquisition of a good does not
appear transactional on its face, such as their pattern of expe-
riences with public services. These patterns become even more
relevant in Part II, in which I discuss consumer laws and prin-
ciples that may reach these economic relationships and, I ar-
gue later, should help to constitute a legal norm of both house-
hold and neighborhood economic empowerment in antimarket
communities.
II. THE SECOND DISTINCTION: CONSUMER LAW
PRINCIPLES AND THE EMPOWERMENT NORM
Having set out the broad characteristics that distinguish
antimarkets from metamarkets and the ways that consumption
bears directly upon community economic empowerment objec-
tives, this Part explores major consumer law principles that
might inform a legal norm of economic empowerment. I ac-
knowledge a certain irony about my premise: Ghetto residents
and their neighborhoods should be thought of as consumers
entitled to the same empowering consumer law protections as
all consumers, yet the central distinction between antimarkets
and metamarkets is that the former do not follow the economic
rules that undergird consumer law. Calls for economic empow-
erment among antimarket consumers must therefore hurdle
systematic exclusion if empowerment as a goal has anything to
do with greater economic incorporation with the metropolitan
areas to which these consumers belong. Thus, this Part looks
at consumer law principles through the prism of that stifling
irony and evaluates what is missing, not necessarily for strict
legal enforcement, but for a legally articulable basis of empow-
erment.
The limitations of conventional legal precepts first require
some clarification. As we will see, much of consumer law focus-
"7 Cf. Cashin, supra note 82, at 585-86 (discussing suburban voter vigilance on
distribution of public funds).
[Vol. 66: 1
2000] ANTIMARKETS, CONSUMPTION, AND EMPOWERMENT 27
es on individualized transactions, both in terms of bringing
claims and devising remedies. A basic contract model underlies
most textbook categories of consumer harm, such as fair adver-
tising, abuses in the formation of contracts, access to credit,
collection practices, and price and interest-rate regulation,"
in order to promote norms of freedom and efficiency within
conventional markets. While relevant, these safeguards do not
present the only way to see problems of consumption. These
protections assume the primacy of meaningful consumer
choice, which itself assumes choice. They assume that "market
failures"' can be corrected through minor, equitable adjust-
ments in contract performance litigated by individual consum-
ers against private vendors. They do not, therefore, assume the
harsh economic realities of the inner-city poor.
Instead, consumption dynamics within the antimarket
context demonstrate a reflexive relationship between communi-
ty well-being and the welfare of individual households, often
blurring the lines between public and private spheres to
marginalizing effect. As I discussed in Part I, consumption
relationships in the ghetto are more sensitive to social and
cultural forces than in metamarkets."' As the hair salon
See generally JOHN SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2d ed. 1991).
I am not comfortable with ascribing market failure to antimarkets because of
these connotations and its capacity to minimize the problems of antimarkets and,
more importantly, the urgency of empowerment. However, Professor Jean
Braucher's description of market failure as a basis for FTC regulation is compel-
ling.
The concept of market failure may be used to justify policing contracts
for unfairness. "Market failure" is a label that can be used to describe a
situation as involving too little knowledge and perhaps too little rationali-
ty as well. Posner is not the only one who uses the term "market fail-
ure" to obscure the necessity of value choices in the policing of contracts.
The liberal need to use the "market failure" label, with its reassuring
overtones of scientific classification, stems from the fact that liberalism is
in general comfortable with the market as an instrument of social choice
and uncomfortable with the idea of social choice through government
'regulation." The FTC's analysis of unfairness, for example, begins with
the assumption that ordinarily the market best serves consumers' inter-
ests; the agency justifies regulation in terms of 'market failure."
Braucher, Defining Unfairness: Empathy and Economic Analysis at the Federal
Trade Commission, 68 B.U. L. REV. 349, 380 (1988) (hereinafter Braucher, Defin-
ing Unfairness). See also Paul H. Brietzke, Urban Development and Human Devel-
opment, 25 IND. L. REV. 741, 763-67 (1991).
10 Although this is probably an under-emphasized observation in most personal
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
hypothetical in the Introduction suggests, 1 there is more in-
formality and less beneficial regulation. Many low-income
people have little experience with formal contracts and, among
blacks in particular, a long history of mistreatment that breeds
distrust.' 2 Fairness for many is often counterposed not only
with the possibility of getting a bad deal, but with being the
victim of discrimination.' ° As a result, the vagaries of
place-the geographic environments in which a deal goes
down-are rarely, if ever, comprehended by consumer laws.
Therefore, the discussion below tracks consumer laws that
roughly comprehend three broad principles: disclosure, equali-
ty, and fairness. The final section analyzes them in the context
of typical antimarket consumer transactions and, before reach-
ing some conclusions about the ingredients of a legal norm of
economic empowerment, finds them lacking three essential
"normative considerations: access, remediation, and accommo-
dation.
contracts, it is particularly acute in transactions involving racial outsiders. See,
e.g., Black D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Contract
Theory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 69-70 (1998) ("[Tihe very
act of bargain formation, i.e., discreet individuals searching out bargains to maxi-
mize the gain, represents an interpersonal dynamic that automatically implicates
subjective notions such as judgment, information processes, bias, opportunism, and
discretion.").
.0. See supra Introduction.
102 See, e.g., Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the
Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1995) ("Instead of being the
vehicle by which ideals of liberty, equality, and autonomy could be fostered, the
courts and dominant constructions of contract law became the means by which
African-Americans became inalienably disempowered; outsiders to the system of
justice and equitable economic opportunity.").
"0 See generally Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in
Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991) (demonstrating that retail
car dealerships systematically offered substantially better prices on identical cars
to white men than they did to blacks and women); Neil G. Williams, Offer, Accep-
tance, and Improper Considerations: A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of
Racial Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 205
(1994) ("One undeniable consequence of the ravages of racial discrimination in this
society is that disproportionately large numbers of minority citizens have neither
the economic means (resulting in a 'lack of voluntariness') nor the access to educa-
tion (resulting in a lack of knowledge') needed to avoid hard bargains in many
cases.").
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A. Disclosure and Equality: The ECOA and the TILA
Disclosure of credit terms, the largest area of consumer
protection beyond product safety laws, is primarily governed by
two federal statutes, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (the
"ECOA") and the Truth-in-Lending Act (the "TILA). '0 The
nominal purpose of the ECOA is to provide accurate informa-
tion to and about consumers involved in credit transactions
and to prohibit credit discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, or marital status. 105 The ECOA
covers creditors who "regularly extend or arrange for the ex-
tension of credit, including banks, finance companies, depart-
ment stores, credit card issuers, loan brokers, and assign-
ees.., as well as savings and loan associations.""6 The
ECOA broadly protects consumers in conventional credit mar-
kets by creating private rights of action against creditors who
might use the information disclosed by prospective borrowers
in a credit application to discriminate."7 Thus, it protects
against misuse of the consumer's voluntary disclosure of per-
sonal information and requires disclosure by the creditor of its
decision and supporting reasons within thirty days of receipt of
a completed application.0 8
1"' The ECOA is codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691 (West 1999). The TILA is codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1667 (West 1999). Both fall under the umbrella of the
Federal Consumer Protection Act of 1968, see 17 AM. JUR. 2d §§ 1-3 (1990). See
also the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 and implementing regulations at 16 C.F.R. §§ 700-702.
-o See 17 AM. JUR. 2d § 169; 15 U.S.C-.A § 1691. See also Anthony D. Taibi,
Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural Economic
Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1465, 1471 (1994) [hereinafter Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic
Empowerment].
17 AM. JUR. 2d § 170.
107 Although the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is responsi-
ble for promulgating regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act, see 17 AM.
JUIL 2d § 171, the Federal Trade Commission has enforcement authority, see 15
U.S.CA § 1691(c) (2000).
1 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(d). See also Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F.
Supp. 2d 444, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that substance governs over form and
because borrowers were not timely informed of the lender's counteroffers to their
home improvement loan requests, the lender violated the ECOA). The Newton
court also stated that "under the ECOA there are three distinct kinds of action a
creditor might take, each triggering a notice requirement: approval, a counteroffer,
and an adverse action." Id. at 459. The ECOA defines "adverse action" as a "deni-
al or revocation of credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement,
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Underlying these disclosure protections is the assumption
of equality-that all applicants be treated equally at least
regarding immutable characteristics and receive the same
information. Thus, in theory, disclosure functions to
guaranteee equality as a byproduct of procedural fairness.
Similar consumer equality concerns underlie disclosures
made pursuant to the TILA. Congress' interest in disclosure
under the TILA was aimed at enhancing economic stabilization
and competition among various financial institutions by allow-
ing all consumers to make informed use of credit."9 The
TILA focuses on disclosures related to finance charges and the
annual percentage rate of interest." ° Consumers (and con-
sumption) are narrowly defined under the TILA to include only
"the party to whom credit is offered or extended [where the
party] is a natural person, and the money, property or services
which are the subject of the transaction [are used] primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes."' The TILA cov-
ers only certain creditors."' The main remedy available to
consumers is rescission of the transaction until midnight of the
or a refusal to grant credit in ...substantially the terms requested." 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1691(d)-(b); see also Jochum v. Pico Credit Corp. of Westbank, 730 F.2d 1041,
1044-45 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the lender's failure to provide written notice
with specific reasons to borrower for denial of the loan was a violation of the
ECOA as it was an adverse action by the lender); 17 AM. JUR. 2D § 183.
109 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601(a). Congress stated that the purpose of this Act is
"to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be
able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid
the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and
unfair credit billing and credit card practices." Id.
110 See, e.g., Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a lender is required to disclose three pieces of information to the
borrower under the TULAZ the amount financed, the finance charge, and the annu-
al percentage rate).
1 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(h).
1 Covered creditors are defined as persons who both (1) regularly extend,
whether in connection with loans, sales of property or services, or otherwise, con-
sumer credit that is payable by agreement in more than four installments or for
which the payment of a finance charge is or may be required; and (2) to whom
the debt is initially payable. See id. at § 1602(f). Thus, for example, secondary
mortgage buyers, unknown to the debtor, have no similar duty of disclosure under
the Act.
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third business day following consummation or the delivery of
the information,"' although civil damages are also
available."4
Disclosure is an obvious pre-condition to economic empow-
erment, particularly with respect to wealth-implicating trans-
actions such as credit."' In the abstract, both the ECOA and
the TILA are important legal tools for antimarket consumers
because they provide an enforceable framework to prevent
discrimination against the vulnerable and, through repetition,
educate lower-income consumers about the risks and require-
ments of long-term financial relationships affecting their
households. Accurate disclosure of relevant terms is, according
to the FTC, the antidote to consumer deception." 6
The problems with both Acts, however, mainly have to do
with practical enforcement by debtors either unaware of viola-
tive practices or unable to afford the legal costs associated with
battling smaller claims. " More importantly, the prevalence
1 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635. See also Mitchell v. Security Inv. Corp. of Palm
Beaches, 464 F. Supp. 650, 653 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (finding consumer could claim
both rescission and double damages where loan documents for home improvement
were defective); 17 AM. JUR. 2D § 118. But see Weber v. Langholz, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 677, 680 (Cal. 1995) (holding that since Ms. Weber borrowed the money to
make investments in coins, the loan was not personal and she could not exercise
right to rescission after she sold the property to a third party). In addition, if the
credit transaction is secured by the borrower's principal dwelling, the borrower
may rescind the loan agreement up to three years after the date of consummation
of the transaction, or upon sale of the property, whichever comes first. See 15
U.S.CA § 1635(f). See also Beach v. Owen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 415-19
(1998) (holding that borrower could recover actual damages for the overstated
amount of the monthly payment and finance charges, but could not rescind the
contract after the three-year statute of limitations had expired).
1' These may include actual damages, penalties, attorney's fees, and costs. See
15 U.S.C. § 1640.
... Low-income consumers are especially vulnerable to credit scams that flow
from non-disclosure of key terms because their access to conventional credit is
often extremely limited. Thus, many creditors can bundle unrequested products
into an ordinary short-term installment loan, thus violating several federal statutes
at once. See, e.g., In re The Money Tree, Inc., File No. 932-30231996, FTC LEXIS
726 (Nov. 20, 1996) (providing loans to low-income consumers in amounts between
$150 and $400, The Money Tree, Inc. required the additional purchase of "extras"
costing $80, including a combination of credit-life, credit accident and health, credit
accident and sickness, or accidental death and dismemberment insurance and/or an
auto club membership, violating the TILA, the FTCA and the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act).
.16 See In re Cliffdale Assocs., 104 F.T.C. 110, 165 (1984).
17 See Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury and Un-
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of fraudulent or at least borderline discriminatory credit prac-
tices in antimarket communities suggests that mandatory
disclosure, while a necessary constraint on credit abuses, sim-
ply does not reach many typical credit transactions, and there-
fore additional protections are needed. The statutes also suffer
from their narrow focus on household consumption, which
again emphasizes individualized transactions without acknowl-
edging the larger economic context in which consumer ex-
changes take place."' Not all problematic offers of credit are
deliberately unscrupulous; many are made by vendors that are
themselves vulnerable, and most are local to areas ignored by
vigilant federal regulators or consumer watchdog
organizations."'
But, for these purposes, the ECOA and the TILA compre-
hend relevant legal principles of equality and disclosure. From
an empowerment perspective, they at least codify notions of
meaningful choice, the relevance of certain kinds of informa-
tion to consumer decisioumaking, and a federal interest in
conscionability: The Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer Interest
Rates Under the Unconscionability Standard, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 721, 769-70 (1994)
[hereinafter Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads]; Braucher, Defining Un-
fairness, supra note 99, at 352, n.14, 396-97. On the prohibitive costs of disclosure
litigation, see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 342 (2d ed. 1990). Commen-
tators have pointed out other structural and practical problems with both Acts,
including the ECOA's reinforcement of status quo economic relationships in the
name of equality. See Taibi, supra note 26, at 1467. Some chronicle the TILA's
ascendence as an inefficient paper mill useful only to bureaucrats. See William C.
Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973
WIsc. L. REV. 400, 420-32 (describing criticisms of the TILA's mandatory disclo-
sures because rate information is either not learned by consumers or is not used
by them in reaching decisions, but concluding that such disclosures exceed the
benefits of voluntary disclosures and reduce overall disclosure costs). Cf. Jonathan
M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 711, 722-24 (1979) (discussing social science evidence of
consumers' cognitive or decisional overload in the actual context of many credit
purchases resulting in diminished attention paid to credit terms); but see David M.
Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and
Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 301 (1986); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 630, 675-77 (1979).
118 At least two commentators have characterized disclosure protections as mid-
dle class in practical application. See Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, A
Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 441, 449
(1967) (describing disclosure protections as "largely middle-class solutions.., to
what has increasingly become a lower-class problem").
19 See id.
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equalized exchange relationships. Thus, they may constitute
parts of a legal norm of empowerment, if only a shell.
B. Unconscionability
Ms. Ora Lee Williams, whose presence in Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.2 is usually the first and last
appearance of a low-income consumer visited upon first-year
law students, has come to epitomize the procedural and sub-
stantive features of a bad deal struck down by the unconscio-
nability doctrine. Since its formal adoption in the U.C.C., the
common law unconscionability doctrine has been enacted by
statute in model consumer protection acts and by several
states.'2' Some commentators, citing a string of onerous cred-
it practices disproportionately affecting low-income consumers,
argue that it is a more effective prophylactic than usury and it
should be directly applied to the kinds of credit transactions
covered by the ECOA and the TILA."2 Even proponents of
more widespread use of the doctrine to combat consumer abus-
es in antimarkets acknowledge what Ms. Williams' singular
presence signifies to students: that the doctrine, perhaps inad-
vertently, presumes a certain dependency among poor people
in which their lack of bargaining power fits a marginalized
profile of economic victim, rather than actor."
120 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
121 For example, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act provision on price
unconscionability, § 4(2), 7A U.L.A. 241 (1971), has been adopted by Kansas, Ohio
and Utah. Wisconsin, Wyoming, Oklahoma, Indiana, Colorado, Utah, and Guam
have adopted Section 5.108 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. California's
unconscionability statute applies generally to all contracts, permitting a court to
refuse contract enforcement or to limit enforcement so as to avoid any unconscio-
nable result. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1670.5 (West 1985).
' See Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 117, at 724-38.
123 See, e.g., Jeffrey Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionabil-
ity, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 445, 491-92 (1994) ("I am concerned about an ap-
proach in which the disadvantaged party is seen as a victim that the law has
more or less rescued. This suggests some element of subordination which, in a
subtle way, cuts against the elevating and vindicating effects that are more pro-
ductive.").
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Under U.C.C. § 2-302,24 unconscionability generally re-
quires that a court find "an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party."'
Although the absence of meaningful choice aspect is associated
with procedural unconscionability and the unfavorable terms
deemed substantive, 6 some writers concerned about low-
income consumers argue that only the substantive unfairness
of deal terms is particularly relevant. 127
Although this analysis is not unsympathetic to unconscio-
nable bargains struck between low-income consumers and
vendors, the focus here is not on price or other contractual
terms. Instead, the relevance of unconscionability doctrine to a
legal norm of economic empowerment may turn as much on a
substantive reading of consumers' bargains as it does on what
is behind that image of Ms. Williams striking that particular
bargain in the first place. Jeffrey Harrison's social psychologi-
cal approach to unconscionability and poor consumers suggests
that, even in the most straightforward consumer transactions,
a "sense of entitlement" divides low-income from middle-in-
come consumers to the former's detriment. 28 His analysis
contends that under either equity theory or relative depriva-
124 Subsection (1) provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
UCC § 2-302(1).
*" Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
," See FARNSWORTH, supra note 117, at 332.
127 See Charles R. Bogle, Unconscionable Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of
Conditions on Public Assistance Benefits, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 193, 232-33 (1994);
Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads, supra note 117, at 749. Other writers
have criticized certain aspects of the doctrine's application, including encourage-
ment of bad risk-taking and inefficiency through a meddling reliance of wealth
redistribution. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reap-
praisal, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 293 (1975); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Wel-
fare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related
Limitations On The Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995) (arguing
that the provision of welfare in a free market produces perverse incentives to take
credit risks, which both drive up the cost of the welfare system and undermine its
goal of poverty reduction).
"' Harrison, supra note 123, at 446.
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tion theory, poor consumers internalize a denigrated notion of
their own worth relative to those who occupy a higher class
status and, because preferences are essentially learned, will
accept a lower level of fairness that reflects a lower self-esteem
in the marketplace. 29 Thus, class status permeates private
contractual ordering, reinforcing diminished expectations of a
fair deal among antimarket consumers and propelling
metamarket consumers to demand better.
The unrelenting message is that those who receive less must have
less to offer and are ultimately less worthy, and, having heard this
message long enough, individuals become even more susceptible to
it. Disadvantaged people tend not to question a world that tells
them how little they have to offer, how little they are entitled to,
and that they are ultimately to blame.13'
Under this analysis of equity theory, Ms. Williams enters
into the deal with Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. by conscious-
ly or unconsciously viewing the distribution of contractual
benefits according to a ratio of outputs to inputs equal to peo-
ple in her own position-that is, poor people living in neighbor-
hoods in which such deals are commonplace. Worse, even
though Ms. Williams may sense that the deal's terms are hor-
ribly unfavorable, she may nevertheless "manufacture" a sense
of equity to fit a local schema of goods procurement, thereby
justifying it as perhaps reasonable under the circumstanc-
es. 3' As a consumer in context, she will not compare her deal
with similar deals in more affluent parts of town.
Alternatively, under two categories of relative deprivation
theory, egoistic and fraternal, the social comparisons she might
make are slightly different and assume greater primacy.
In the case of egoistic deprivation, the individual compares [her]
plight with that of a similar referent, with the emphasis on the
individual's own well-being. With fraternal deprivation, the scope of
the comparison changes; the focus is on the plight of the group of
which the individual is a member, as compared to a better situated
group .... Individual transactions are more likely to raise issues of
egoistic deprivation. 3'
12 See id. at 447-49.
130 Id. at 467-68.
131 See id. at 458-60 ("[1]ndividuals tend to avoid making comparisons with
cohorts who are dissimilar.").
132 Id. at 461-62.
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Harrison's personality inquiries are somewhat consistent
with the environmental postulates of my antimarket/meta-
market dichotomy. Both environments work to condition the
economic expectations not only of the household consumers
who live there but also the commercial establishments, public
institutions, and service providers doing or seeking business in
the respective communities. That the rules and customs are
different in each is less obvious to those familiar with fixed,
internal referents. Operating in separate economic systems,
few consumers are in a position to wonder about the fairness of
particular transactions outside of local spheres divided by
class.133
These underlying assertions about personality dynamics
have obvious import for legal norms of empowerment. They
flag the concern that even the most well-intentioned economic
development strategies may be limited by place-based expecta-
tions of change. Further, they highlight the need to consider
how empowerment as a goal may necessitate fundamental
consumer education about the broader distribution of
"entitlements" in every-day transactions. Finally, they lead to
questions about how substantive unconscionability may reach
other kinds of consumer exchanges, such as the expectations of
public assistance recipients, in which unspoken rules of service
provision for the poor are routinely denigrated compared to
middle-income consumers.
34
13 According to Braucher, antimarket consumers may not care to wonder about
the fairness of a credit transaction, instead making the pyschological comparison of
belonging generally to the class of people who can be approved for such transac-
tions.
A consumer borrower may feel some elation at the social participation of
entering into the market in a significant way and at the approval thus
conferred by the creditor. This may produce a desire to play the expected
role by dutifully assuming the obligation and not questioning the authori-
ty of the entity that confers approval and good feelings. Creditors' ordi-
nary presentation of adhesion contracts-as a matter of course and as
how these things are done-adds to the consumer's sense of appropriate
role-playing.
Braucher, Defining Unfairness, supra note 99, at 366-67.
13, See generally Bogle, supra note 127. Bogle argued by analogy that unconscio-
nability should be applicable to unconstitutional conditions analysis with respect to
fundamental rights encumbered by welfare laws, triggering strict scrutiny. Citing
cases such as Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (finding Fourth Amendment
restrictions on aid recipients), Bogle argued that recipients sometimes give up
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The risk in these analyses, however, is to assume a certain
ignorance of fairness on the part of marginalized consumers.
Acceptance of substantively bad deal terms should not be
conflated with endorsement, psychological or otherwise. A
consumer may know that the deal is not a good one even
though it is common in the area.'
Alternatively, they may not know that a given lending rate
would be considered usurious outside of their redlined commu-
nity. Yet their options are limited, not by an internalized infe-
riority or lack of self-desert, but by ugly circumstances proba-
bly within their knowledge but beyond their control. Despite a
crippled capacity to litigate new economic norms into local
existence,.. there is evidence that low-income consumers are
quite motivated to shop in metamarket neighborhoods, where
the goods and services are more varied, cheaper, and of better
quality. 137
In any event, what we may take from an inquiry into un-
conscionability doctrine and economic empowerment at this
point in the analysis is a heightened appreciation of substan-
tive shortcomings in the kinds of commercial exchanges low-
income consumers regularly enter and an awareness of the
possible differences in consumers' expectations of fairness
based on their class position.
protected rights as a quid pro quo for public benefits. He stated, 'Where govern-
ments pass such legislation, it should be struck down as unconscionable unless
some compelling state interest can be shown." Bogle, supra note 127, at 233.
"3 The reactions to obvious public school disparities by low-income students cast
even further doubt on generalizing Harrison's claim too far. When asked about the
reason for differences in the physical condition of his school compared to white
middle-class schools, a Puerto Rican high school student replied, "If you threw us
all into some different place, some ugly land, and put white children in this build-
ing in our place, this school would start to shine. No question. The parents would
say: 'This building sucks. Its ugly. Fix it up.' They'd fix it fast-no question."
KOZOL, supra note 91, at 104.
1 See note 117 supra.
13 See generally, Troutt, Poor Pay More, supra note 29, a study for Consumers
Union demonstrating empirically that low-income consumers regularly find ways to
travel to middle-class neighborhoods for goods and services such as groceries and




C. Unfairness: Consumer Injury
Discussions of unconscionability often fold into larger in-
quiries about transactional fairness' where the FTC has es-
tablished a useful starting point. In 1980, the Commission
issued its first version of the Unfairness Statement,139 later
modified and explained in subsequent decisions. "Unfairness"
requires a finding of "substantial unavoidable consumer inju-
ry,"240 a broad standard that on its face would appear rele-
vant to many of the "ghetto shopping" and other experiences of
antimarket consumers described in Part I. Thus, the provision
of inadequate public health care or education, the unavailabili-
ty of consumer and business financing except at rates inflated
by redlining, or the mistreatment of consumers seeking afford-
able baby clothes or fruits and vegetables would all, despite
the variety of vendors, seem to raise legitimate questions about
the fairness of related transactions. The standard, however,
breaks down into three elements: (1) how substantial the inju-
ry is; (2) whether the practice in question produces offsetting
benefits that outweigh the injury; and (3) whether consumers
could have reasonably avoided the injury.' Taking each
briefly in turn demonstrates how Commission analysis makes
unfairness difficult to prosecute, while revealing principles
relevant to a norm of economic empowerment.
The FTC explained the meaning of its three unfairness
elements in In re International Harvester Company,142 where
the Commission ultimately found that the tractor
manufacturer's failure to adequately inform its purchasers
about the dangers of "fuel geysering" was unfair within the
1" Braucher, Defining Unfairness, supra note 99, at 350. See also Williams,
supra note 103, at 204 ("[Tjhe unconscionability doctrine . . .openly and explicitly
is geared toward . . . fairness determinations."); FARNSWORTH, supra note 117, at
323-24 (noting the doctrine's emergence out of equity).
13 See Letter from the Federal Trade Commission to Senators Ford and
Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 156, pt. 1, at 33-40 (1983)
[hereinafter Unfairness Policy Statement]. However, the roots of the unfairness fac-
tors come from the Commission's so-called "Cigarette Rule" sixteen years earlier.
See Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325,
8355 (1964).
1"0 In re Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 360 (1986).
1.1 See id. at 362.
142 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984).
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meaning of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. As
to substantiality, the Commission wrote that "unfairness cases
usually involve actual or completed harms[,]" which may be
monetary or, as the policy statement indicated, present "un-
warranted health and safety risks."4" The second element,
harm in net effects, "requires us to balance against the risks of
injury the costs of notification and the costs of determining
what the prevailing consumer misconceptions really are" -a
detailed analysis.' Finally, the unavoidability of the injury
factor requires that "the injury be one that consumers could
not reasonably have avoided through the exercise of consumer
choice."145 Thus, the entire analysis entails cost-benefit bal-
ancing, focusing "on the maintenance of consumer choice and
consumer sovereignty" in the operation of free markets. 46
Noting the efficiency-oriented language of the Comm-
ission's unfairness pronouncements, at least one author has
argued for normative inquiries alongside its cost-benefit analy-
sis.147 That analysis boils down to determining whether mar-
ket failure exists and what substitution of outcomes might sat-
isfy the balance, a two-step process designed ultimately "to try
to empathize with the situation of consumers."48
If fairness and efficiency are often thought to be mutually
exclusive, empathy and efficiency are even harder to join. This
may be especially true where the consumer situations at issue
are isolated in antimarkets where notions about fairness may
differ substantially from the norms operating in metamarkets.
Empathizing with low-income consumers might also entail
empathy for how they came to be low-income consumers in the
first place, or how ghettoes became antimarkets, questions that
sometimes reduce to simplistic considerations of blame or dis-
crimination that again work to push the poor to the margins of
3 Id. at 247 (citing the Unfairness Policy Statement).
14. Id. at 247-48.
' Id. at 248.
" See id. at 247-48.
147 Braucher, Defining Unfairness, supra note 99, at 352 ("Although this is an
understandable reaction to the political pressures the Commission faces, the result
is that the explanations it offers for its regulatory actions are sometimes incom-
plete or unconvincing .... The use of economic labels is part of the FTC's effort
to de-emphasize the necessity of value choices.").
.. Braucher, Defining Unfairness, supra note 99, at 352.
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normal productivity and consumer exchange. For this reason
alone, however, it might be a helpful exercise.
Begin by assuming several consumer scenarios, graduating
the degree of abstraction outward from, for example, the
household hair care services consumer to the neighborhood as
a consumer of resources for parks and recreation. In the exam-
ple of the Harlem hair salon (described in the Introduction), it
is easy to empathize with the customer, Shawna. Although she
is but a single consumer, FTC unfairness analysis (despite its
tendency to look at more aggregate claims) would seem readily
to apply. A fairness norm construed in that way would protect
her from substantial injury arising from the use of poor prod-
ucts or their negligent application, such as a severely damaged
scalp or long-term hair loss.149 The net effects element is
probably satisfied with a showing that Aaki, the stylist, could
have opted for the less damaging product or procedure without
substantially increasing her own costs. The last element, un-
avoidability, is a little more problematic. Imagining ourselves
as Shawna, we could have gotten our hair done elsewhere (or
even walked out if we sensed something was wrong). But our
empathy might be broader; it might also assume that the con-
straints upon stylists like Aaki are similar throughout neigh-
borhoods like this one where we are more likely to find stylists
who specialize in black women's hairstyles.
A norm of consumer fairness is more easily susceptible to
empathic evaluation when the subject is the individual con-
sumer seeking necessities and basic conveniences. In addition
to hairstyling, we might demand similar modes of commercial
fairness in leasing an apartment, buying groceries, purchasing
clothing or furniture, or seeking family counseling or prenatal
care. These kinds of consumption activities are shared by most
of us, and the use by some does not seriously infringe on the
use by the rest of us.
Now take the example of the community consumer seeking
parks and recreation for a neighborhood with a disproportion-
ate number of children and teenagers but few places to play.
The injuries here are the incalculable problems associated with
idle youth, dangerous substitute play spaces (such as streets),
and other ills associated with not having the resource avail-
... Of course, her claims might also sound in tort.
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able. In other words, there has been no transaction to police.
Yet the injury is substantial. The cost-benefit balance seems
clearly to favor parks and pools over idleness and domesticity.
And here unavoidability is patently unreasonable: people sim-
ply will not just stay home nor feel welcome traveling across
town. Yet the common absence of parks and recreation in
antimarket neighborhoods (or their maintenance and safety)
suggests a clear lack of empathy by those who enjoy such com-
mon facilities in other parts of the city and a manifest unfair-
ness by comparison. An unfairness analysis of public transpor-
tation, road repair, locally unwanted land uses ("LULU")
siting, and public education would yield similar conclusions. It
might also demonstrate a lack of empathy not only by unaffect-
ed consumers (e.g., NIMIBYism), but more importantly by ven-
dors of public services. The legal problem, of course, is that the
mode of consumption implicated by these goods and services is
again beyond the reach of established consumer law. That is, it
demonstrates the distinction between legally recognized con-
sumer protections and economic empowerment.
D. Toward a Legal Norm of Economic Empowerment
The foregoing analysis of consumer law principles and
antimarkets takes us deep into considerations about the con-
stituent legal norms that might inform a larger legal norm of
economic empowerment, but it also reveals many shortcom-
ings. The three established areas of consumer protec-
tion-disclosure, unconscionability, and fairness-do not con-
stitute the entire field of available legal protections. Nor were
all their inherent norms and objectives fully explored here. The
point is not to survey all the available statutes that might be
utilized by consumers and agencies in inner-city economic
development strategies. Rather, the objective is to distill estab-
lished legal precepts of an empowerment norm where they
exist and to expand them where they do not. This requires a
continuation of the exercise in the last section.
But first it is relevant to isolate elements of what econom-
ic empowerment may mean, at least in a root sense. Given the
psychological literature about how economic access to certain
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goods and services is conditioned,1 50 empowerment implies a
condition of psychic and economic belonging. To feel empow-
ered probably requires a capacity for asserting one's economic
interests, a feeling that derives in part from perceived econom-
ic as well as political status. Like the fearless negotiator, this
may imply the ability to walk away at the recognition of a bad
deal. Such a complicated state of belonging and self-support, I
submit, has something to do with command over the resources
that ultimately bring about personal or community growth.
Rather than the desired outcome itself, empowerment involves
the internal capacity for the desired outcome.
1. Disclosure, Equality, and Fairness
Thie three consumer law principles explicit in the earlier
discussions of this Part are disclosure, equality, and fair-
ness-all within the established confines of a contractual ex-
change and all within the context of an individual consumer
transaction. Though each is critical to low-income consumers,
antimarket conditions demand a broader notion of relevant
consumption. That is, they demonstrate the impact that the
neighborhood, as consumer, has on the individual household
consumer (or commercial enterprise). When the unfairness
exercise reached beyond individuals to community resources,
its protections failed for three reasons. First, the dearth of
certain resources in antimarkets may cement a pre-contractual
condition. Second, the injuries, though undoubtedly substan-
tial, may not easily be quantified. Third, the law currently
does not conceive of consumer protection as collectivized, ex-
cept by aggregating bad individual bargains.
Nevertheless, we can imagine many typical household
consumer situations in which the greater operation of disclo-
sure, equality, and fairness norms would have an empowering
effect. In addition to grocery shopping, apartment rentals, and
home furnishing purchases on credit, we could include mort-
gage lending and public services such as public transportation,
education, and social services.5 For the low-income consum-
er, all of these transactions require that terms are disclosed,
... See generally Harrison, supra note 123.
..1 For an illustration, see discussion infra Part V.
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that the goods and/or services are provided on an equitable
basis, and that without thc.e protections, an unfairness is
worked to a debilitating and disempowering degree. Expanding
our notion of relevant consumption, we could find that local
businesses depend on the same norms to govern the provision
of commercial real estate leasing, sanitation and utilities, and
banking and credit relationships. Without investment supports
on such terms, local commercial markets remain skeletal or
decline.152 Finally, looking at the community as a consumer
brings many of the same benefits full circle. The resources for
public safety, schools, transportation, infrastructure, and even
parks inure to the benefit of individual households in the com-
munity.
But clearly that is not all that these categories of
antimarket consumers need in order to realize greater econom-
ic empowerment. At best, these merely level the playing field,
and only theoretically at that. However, as antimarkets, these
urban communities (and many of the consumer households
living within them) have been systematically disfavored in the
provision of economic resources for a very long time. A founda-
tion for economic empowerment is therefore unlikely without
at least three more principles of consumption rarely empha-
sized in consumer law: access, remediation, and accommoda-
-tion.
2. Access, Remediation, and Accommodation
Without access to economic and other resources, norms
like remediation and accommodation have no meaning in
antimarkets. Access may be read narrowly to mean the reason-
able availability of basic neighborhood goods and services close
to home, or broadly to encompass opportunity, such as a com-
munity voice in public decisionmaking or systems of credit to
counteract the dearth of capital caused by redlining.53 The
..2 See Troutt, Poor Pay More, supra note 29, at 30-34 (comparing, inter alia,
constraints on necessary business expansion between low- and middle-income area
merchants).
15 Redining may be considered the epitome of an antimarket's lack of access in
the broad sense of opportunity. Redlining artificially diminishes opportunity by
profiling a neighborhood for capital deprivation. As investments flow out of and
away from redlined areas, opportunities for commercial and non-profit organization
20001
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Community Reinvestment Act 5 4 (the "CRA") is an example of
the broader access norm enacted through federal legislation. In
theory, it is intended to counteract the historic effects of bank
redlining by charging qualified lending institutions with geo-
graphically defined obligations to make home loans available
to underserved markets.'55 This particular form of economic
access-as-structural-opportunity is also associated with
remediation in the sense that the imposition of the CRA obli-
gations on banks is justified by the need to remedy the effects
of past and present discrimination. 6 The analogy to civil
rights laws generally is not accidental.
Similarly, remediation as a legal norm may simply return
people to the position they were in before something untoward
happened. Yet, in the antimarket context, it may acknowledge
the history of racial and economic exclusion by which cumula-
tive disadvantages have sedimented."5 ' The processes of ex-
clusion discussed in Part I, such as a lack of land use planning
and protections or the abandonment of public services, literally
scar the landscape, hindering economic growth and signaling
marginalization to disempowered residents. Remediation, in
the sense of bringing additional resources to long underserved
communities, is therefore critical to antimarket empowerment.
Finally, accommodation of neighborhood peculiarities and
demographic differences makes this a necessary norm within
empowerment. Access, remediation, and accommodation work
together. For instance, the three consumer law principles (dis-
closure, equality, and fairness) may positively impact upon
community consumption needs, such as public schools, safety,
transportation, and infrastructure. But they fail to reach the
ground beneath, which contains the sedimentation of long
unmet needs. Further, the needs and preferences of
antimarket consumers often differ substantially from those of
metamarket consumers in both kind and severity.' For ex-
as well as job creation, homeownership, and a more stable tax base dry up, sys-
tematically contributing to further economic decline.
14 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994).
See generally 12 U.S.C. § 2901.
See Taibi, supra note 26, at 1467.
15 See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 61, at 51.
158 See, e.g., Regina Austin, An Honest Living': Street Vendors, Municipal Regu-
lation, and the Black Public Sphere, 103 YALE L.J. 2119, 2123 (1994) (discussing
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ample, public education in ghettoes is complicated by many
factors unseen in middle-class schools, but the amount and
type of resource allocations are certainly foremost among
them.'59 Low-income students obviously require greater ac-
cess to the public good that is education, but mere equality of
school funding and environmental inputs is unlikely to magi-
cally empower students where they are. Instead, their differ-
ences (economic, social, cultural, etc.) as students coming from
and mired in acutely difficult circumstances in turn must char-
acterize the allocation of that public good if it is to have the
empowering effect on students' economic lives that most educa-
tion consumers seek. Thus, access, remediation, and accommo-
dation help assure the conditions for economic empowerment.
3. A Legal Norm of Economic Empowerment
Earlier, I defined empowerment in its root sense as the
condition of pyschic and economic belief in and belonging to
the capacity for self-support and stability, buttressed by the
ownership of or command over the resources that effectuate
outcomes conducive to growth. Its legalistic tenor reflects an
attempt to see empowerment as a norm general enough to
comprehend all consumers. Command over resources need not
be strictly economic resources; growth need not be based solely
on wealth or income. The idea is relational and aspirational;
these are its raw materials. Empowerment is a condition of
strength and agency.
The discussion of consumer law principles now helps to
refine the above definition in the more specific context of in-
ner-city economic development, where "empowerment" is often
used but rarely defined. Wh .at, then, is a legal norm of econom-
ic empowerment? The legal norm of economic empowerment is
a condition of agency capable of bringing about self-support,
street vending cultural goods).
... See supra Part I-A.2. See also KOZOL, supra note 91, at 115 ("When a school
board hires just one woman to retrieve 400 missing children from the streets of
the North Bronx, we may reasonably conclude that it does not particularly desire
to find them."). Similar arguments may be made about the relationship between
law enforcement and antimarket consumers, the different needs for public trans-
portation among the poor, and the greatly deferred needs of infrastructure mainte-
nance.
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stability, and growth through the protected control and owner-
ship of economic resources. The legal norm is actualized by
resort to principles of open disclosure, access, equality of treat-
ment, remediation of persistent constraints on capacity, fair-
ness concerns for preventing substantial, unavoidable injuries,
and accommodation of differences. It is rooted in consumption
dynamics both between individuals and community and be-
tween community and the wider metropolis.
A remaining question is whether the empowerment norm's
objectives are consistent with a consumer-oriented approach,
given obvious reservations about consumerism, and implicates
larger cultural questions about the extent to which the legal
and economic realms cross into the realms of the personal and
political. This is the third relevant distinction and probably the
most subtle: consumerism versus beneficial consumption.
These matters are the subject of Part III.
III. THE THIRD DISTINCTION: CONSUMERISM AND BENEFICIAL
CONSUMPTION
A. Critiques of Consumption and the Antimarket Difference
Even if the law were to comprehend consumption more
broadly than consumer law has in the past, this does not alone
justify making consumption a beneficial basis for an empow-
erment norm. Local government law scholars such as Jerry
Frug have long observed how the distribution of goods and
services in and around cities has become consumerized to det-
rimental effect. 6 ° Frug rightly laments the anti-
communitarian effects of contemporary thinking about the
urban milieu as an individualized shopping spree for the right
schools, parks, taxes, and subsidies.'' In earlier writing, I
have responded that these tendencies, for the most part, be-
long to an already-empowered middle class, whose needs for
basic public and private goods and services have long been
met.
162
" See Frug, City Services, supra note 78, at 42.
161 See Frug, City Services, supra note 78, at 28-34.
1 See Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy, supra note 2, at 479-80.
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What Frug and others criticize might best be considered
excesses and luxuries of consumerism, rather than a universal
norm of conspicuous acquisition that puts all places within the
metropolis at equal risk of "I got mine-ism." Antimarkets, I
have argued, need more responsive consumer infrastruc-
tures,"e which include many of the same amenities (and op-
portunities) now abundant in wealthier parts of town.
But some within the inner-city economic development law
community worry about another dimension of consumerism.
Specifically, they decry the professionalization of community
economic development lawyers too concerned with material
improvements in antimarket neighborhoods than with econom-
ic empowerment." Daniel Shah, for example, persuasively
argues that my notion of empowerment, as the condition of
agency capable of bringing about self-support, stability and
growth, is directly undermined by strong tendencies to allow
outside corporate interests to exploit under-utilized markets
for profit rather than enhanced community control.6 ' Federal
empowerment zone legislation has provoked similar structural
criticisms of larger-scale economic development strategies. 6
16 "Consumer infrastructure" may also denote an aggregate measure of a given
neighborhood's available public and private goods and services, which then allows
for objective comparisons between communities. See generally Troutt, Poor Pay
More, supra note 29 (analyzing housing, health care, lending, and other services in
four California neighborhoods).
'" See Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Developemtn
and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217, 250 (1999) He wrote:
[f the ends of community development remain material improvements,
and the means continue to subordinate the voices of the communities
they serve, and funding community-based organization[s] co-opts leaders
by giving them a stake in the system that continues to oppress their
constituents, then community development programs will never present a
stage on the trajectory of the path to empowerment.
Id.
165 See id. at 234. Perhaps Shah's best example of this "professionalized," yet
distancing, role is the shift from government subsidies for housing development to
tax credits. "Because of the private sector's focus on measurable returns on invest-
ments, the priority of projects addressing material improvements increased." Id.
The complexity of the deals increased reliance on lawyers.
"' Id. at 240-41. See also Otto J. Hetzel, Some Historical Lessons for Imple-
menting the Clinton Administration's Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Commu-
nities Program: Experiences from the Model Cities Program, 26 URB. LAW. 63, 68,
79 (1994); Wilton Hyman, Empowerment Zones, Enterprise Communities, Black
Buisness, and Unemployment, 53 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 143, 160-62
(1998); see generally Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy, supra note 2.
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Still others draw the parallel to the bureacratization of public
institutions such as welfare and schools, so dominant in the
fabric of inner-city life. They note convincingly how the disin-
terest in recipients' actual lives and the indifference to person-
al decisionmaking dehumanizes local residents and contributes
to systematic disempowerment of the poor."'
These are real problems for a consumer-oriented approach
to empowerment. In some form or another, most of these criti-
cisms prescribe decentralized control,168 if not direct grass-
roots takeover of commercial and non-commercial institutions
within antimarkets.'69 Like the land use roots of metamarket
development across America, local control of community char-
acter, aided by concrete forms of economic stakeholdership and
participatory decisionmaking, probably builds empowered com-
munities. This, by itself, is an unproblematic conclusion, but it
assumes "the community" would not want a focus on physical
improvements or a Starbucks on every corner. Because it
might, decentralized control is only a means to implementing
the goals of economic empowerment. But those goals are not
clear.
Anthony Taibi has articulated one of the clearest visions of
economic empowerment goals, although he qualifies his specific
banking proposals by acknowledging that his community em-
powerment paradigm represents "more a sensibility and ap-
proach" than a distinct body of doctrine."' It is based on a
critique of existing federal banking and credit statutes, such as
the ECOA and the CRA, mainly for attempting ineffecient
" See Jacqueline Pope, The Colonizing Impact of Public Service Bureaucracies
in Black Communities, in RACE, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 141
(James Jennings ed., 1992). "'[B]ureacratization' is intensifying and steadily de-
stroying the capacity of African-Americans to develop strategies of empowerment
and self-help. Vast numbers of African-Americans are controlled by four major pub-
lic institutions: the police forces, schools, health agencies and public assistance."
Id. Further, Pope argues that public bureaucracies-and public assistance in par-
ticular--contribute to the depoliticization of black people by withholding
decisionmaking control over the resources necessary to live and dehumanizing
black recipients as undeserving or lazy rather than recognizing them as clients or
citizens. See id. at 142.
16" See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1908 (1994); Gerald E. Frug, Decentering
Decentralization, 60 U. CI. L. REV. 253, 273-303 (1993).
169 See Pope, supra note 167, at 146.
170 See Taibi, supra note 26, at 1541.
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equality-based financial reforms without addressing the op-
pressive character of economic globalization on local communi-
ties of color. His specific proposals call for strengthening com-
munity development financial institutions, such as credit un-
ions; community-development banks and loan finds, whose
entrepreneurship and close relationships with community
development corporations assure greater "independence, local
control, and freedom from red tape."" But over all, Taibi
presents a comprehensive, aspirational set of empowerment
goals that subsumes economic models within the social and
political realities beyond the ghetto's borders. It warrants quot-
ing at some length:
Community empowerment shows us that our real interests lie in
establishing economic and political structures that strengthen com-
munity-based institutions and allow the issues that most directly
touch people's lives to be decided at the local level. Community em-
powerment advances the interests of every non-elite American, re-
gardless of race or ethnicity, and addresses problems of middle-class
anomie as well as of lower-class hopelessness. Part of the struggle
must be to create a financial structure that ensures that all Ameri-
cans can buy and improve their own homes, start and maintain
their own businesses, and serve their own people. A community-
empowerment paradigm sees lower- and middle-class Blacks and
Whites as united by their desires to resist the cultural and economic
colonization of their respective communities and to engage in self-
determination. Moreover, a community-empowerment approach may
provide a more legitimate and enduring basis for transracial politics,
because unlike existing civil rights paradigms, community empower-
ment is based on a genuine respect for our differences.'
None of Taibi's statements appear to preclude a consumer-
oriented approach to economic empowerment nor to reject the
legal principles constitutive of the norm that I have proposed.
In the abstract, if consumption is an effective organizing prin-
ciple in both middle-class and low-income communities (albeit
driven mainly by narrow self-interest), then it may provide a
foundation for the type of inclusion, self-determination, and
transracial politics that he and others advocate.
171 Id. at 1522.
172 Id. at 1516-17.
17 See John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of
Cause Lawyering At the Interesection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM. L.
REV. 1927, 1952 (1999).
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But consumption, like economic globalization, does not
affect all communities within the city the same way. A harrow-
ing array of vulnerabilities, such as gentrification 74 or carte
blanche dealmaking among private-sector actors, make
antimarkets susceptible to destructive consumerist dynamics
that may subordinate the interests and voices of low-income
consumers. Unlike metamarkets, from which the middle class
can effectively exit when the ideals of local economic arrange-
ments are destabilized, the persistently poor cannot move so
easily-or thwart changes by threatening exodus. At the level
of political influence and economic staying power, antimarket
residents and institutions are in a radically different position
than metamarket consumers. Therefore, economic empower-
ment in ghettoes must at some point embrace meanings differ-
ent than those that fuel and stabilize the norm in middle-class
areas.
B. Cultural Critiques of Consumption Within Antimarkets
The above considerations suggest problems for a consumer
approach because of consumption modes from outside the
antimarket community itself. But the dangers of relying too
heavily on consumption emanate from within antimarkets, too.
This is mainly because, as I discussed earlier, 7 ' consumption
as a part of identity, status, and belonging is powerfully cul-
tural. And, for empowerment purposes, what is cultural is in-
creasingly economic.
If, as Celia Lury notes, "[CIonsumer choice is still the
means by which our society thinks about individual agency
and autonomy and makes judgments... about personal identi-
ty,"'76 then it is both an opportunity for and a threat to em-
powerment. Nowhere is this perhaps more true than consump-
17 See generally NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND
THE REVANCHIST CITY (1996). According to Smith, gentrification is a back-to-the-
city movement by capital rather than people. See id. at 70. It rests on historical
waves of devalorization in the spaces between the urban center and the outlying
areas, reflecting a sort of natural depreciation of once more expensive land. "This
devalorization produces the objective economic conditions that make capital revalu-
ation (gentrification) a rational market response." Id. at 67.
"" See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
'76 LURY, supra note 74, at 248.
[Vol. 66: 1
ANTIMARKETS, CONSUMPTION, AND EMPOWERMENT
tion in ghettoes where the risk of being measured and swal-
lowed up by material possession has higher stakes and dan-
gers for household wealth and welfare. 77 Culture as an in-
dustry is all over ghettoes, producing true market participation
on a global scale.7 8 Most writers about the consumption hab-
its of the poor tend to focus on popular culture, usually black
popular culture. Of course, most ghetto neighborhoods are not
populated primarily by teenagers, gangster rappers, or drug
dealers. But their effect on cultural identity in a consumer
sense is extensive enough to question the viability of a consum-
er-oriented approach to economic empowerment.
Alluding to these black popular culture forms, sounds, and
imagery, Cornel West connects some of their underlying values
to what he calls the nihilistic threat to existence that goes
beyond economic deprivation and political powerlessness to a
"profound sense of psychological depression, personal worth-
lessness, and social despair so widespread in black Ameri-
ca." 79 According to West, the nihilistic threat is the greatest
threat to black America-greater than racist oppression-and
" Excessive consumerism in ghetto neighborhoods can be lethal. Although the
adolescent obsession with the latest athletic footwear or prominently visible gold
jewelry is glorified daily in rap songs and videos, less remembered is the violence
sometimes associated with it. These and other consumer items may be idealized
for the luxury of "living large" that they represent, but the finest clothing, adorn-
ments, cars, and champagne are attainable by very few with ghetto in-
comes--except drug dealers. Hence the association with these accoutrements is
embedded in criminal culture: what a drug dealer can have, what a gangster can
take. The two inextricable associations, the one for the pleasure of possession, the
other for personal status, may explain the importance these items achieve and
why ghettoes are replete with the images of young people shot by other young
people taking what little measure of them that they can. Although the fatalities
are occasionally newsworthy, the near fatalities, particularly the sight of paralyzed
young people crossing the streets in wheelchairs, is a daily reminder in many
communities of too much desire overwhelmed by too much desperation over unat-
tainable icons. See, e.g., David Rhode, The Shattered Lives Left by a Street War,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2000, at A29 (citing reports that estimate hundreds, perhaps
thousands of inner-city adolescents across the nation are paralyzed by shooters
seeking personal items from their innocent and criminal victims, one of whom
describes the adolescents as "sort of casualties of the ghetto").
178 See, e.g., Calvin Wilson, It Takes a Nation of Hip-Hop; Rap Music has Ex-
ploded Across Racial Lines without Being Co-opted, KANSAS CITY STAR, Mar. 12,
2000, at J1 (describing origins and rise of rap music popularity beyond inner-city
neighborhoods).
.7. Cornel West, Nihilism in Black America, in BLACK POPULAR CULTURE 21
(Gina Dent & Michele Wallace eds., 1992).
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it is often concealed by both liberal structuralist accounts and
conservative behaviorist accounts of contemporary black cul-
ture. Critiquing liberals in particular, West argues:
We should reject the idea that structures are primarily economic
and political creatures-an idea that sees culture as an ephemeral
set of behavioral attitudes and values. Culture is quite as structural
as the economy or politics; it is rooted in institutions like families,
schools, churches, synagogues, mosques, and communication indus-
tries (television, radio, video, music). Similarly, the economy and
politics are not only influenced by values, they also promote particu-
lar ideals of the good life and good society."n
For West and others,'81 this threat has always been a
part of African-American existence, but recently increased by
factors such as commodification of black life, problems of black
leadership, and the shattering of black civil society's institu-
tions (e.g., families, churches, neighborhoods, and schools).182
He is especially critical of "corporate market institutions" and
how they work to shape culture for profit:
The common denominator in these [market] calculations and [cost-
benefit] analyses is usually the provision, expansion, and intensifica-
tion of pleasure .... This [is] especially evident in the culture in-
dustries-television, radio, video, music-in which gestures of fore-
play and orgiastic pleasure flood the marketplace."
West's analysis reveals deep fissures in notions of entre-
preneurial activity, let alone economic empowerment, in
antimarket communities. Although blacks and Latinos do not
spend consumer dollars on entertainment in numbers any-
where near whites in America," entertainment-oriented en-
180 Id.
'a' See, e.g., Stuart Hall, What Is This 'Black' In Black Popular Culture?, in
BLACK POPULAR CULTURE 21 (Gina Dent & Michele Wallace eds., (1992)). Hall
argues that a danger of globalizing black popular culture out of its traditional
place in contradiction and marginalization is commodification, presumably its total-
izing expression through "the industries where culture enters directly into the cir-
cuits of dominant technology-the circuits of power and capital." Id. at 26.
" See West, supra note 179, at 41.
1'3 Id. at 41-42.
' For example, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998 Consumer
Expenditures Survey, the average annual expenditures for entertainment (fees, ad-
missions, TVs, radio, and sound equipment) was $1,746 for all households. Howev-
er, the breakdown by racial and ethnic groups is revealing- Hispanic, $1,148; Afri-
can American, $1,064; but $1,801 for Non-Hispanic and non-African-American (pri-
marily whites and Asians). See Bureau of Labor Statistics web site (visited Sept.
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trepreneurship is seizing the imagination of a great many pro-
spective entrepreneurs of color.1" If Taibi is correct that re-
spect for genuine community differences forms the basis of
economic empowerment and that economic empowerment en-
tails local control and self-determination, then the powerful
cultural forces that direct antimarket consumption must be
subject to the kind of critiques that accompany American con-
sumerism in general. If West is right about the nihilistic obses-
sion with pleasure that reduces cultural output to a dangerous
commodification of identity, then a consumer-oriented ap-
proach to economic empowerment walks an impossibly fine line
between the fulfillment of personal agency and the totalizing
demands of "I got mine." How might the balance be struck?
C. The Balance of Empowerment: Transforming Consumption
One starting point on the way to achieving balance returns
to the premise of this Article: that prevailing notions of con-
sumerism and consumption divide favored and marginalized
places within the city, but that notions of consumption can be
reformulated to aid empowerment. Indeed, our common status
as consumers is the fulcrum of a balanced perspective. And if
inclusion rather than isolation is a primary objective of com-
munity economic empowerment (and it must be), then empow-
erment strategies that include the poor in the economic life of
the city demand that the rest of the city include the poor in
beneficial consumption. Re-formulating consumption from
within the unspoken boundaries of our consumer culture there-
fore necessitates a re-evaluation of the entitlements we receive
and the desires for what we and our communities buy. Some-
times metamarkets get too much in the distribution of public
and private goods and services. Often, antimarket communities
7, 2000) <httpl//stats.bls.gov/sahome.html>.
18 See Greg Johnson, The Ball's in His Court; As Corporate Contracts Expire,
Shaq Goes Into Business for Himself, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 1998, at D5 (chronicling
basketball player Shaquille O'Neil's assorted business ventures in music and cloth-
ing under his TWISM'--The World Is Mine-trademark). See also Vanessa E.
Jones, For Badder or for Worse, Embrace It or Deplore It, 'Pimp Chic' is Selling
Music, Clothes, and More, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 2000, at D1 (describing the
"ghetto-fabulous" styles popular among rappers-turned clothes designers and the
attraction to 1970s pimp culture).
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seek too little. Both they and the household consumers within
them, for sometimes different reasons, indulge in unproductive
excesses.
Yet the first danger in rejecting a consumer-oriented ap-
proach may be in assuming the insurmountability of simple
dualisms: individual/group, poor/non-poor, minority/majority,
good neighborhood/bad neighborhood, prudent consump-
tion/waste. Measured by a legal norm of empowerment, distinc-
tions are better made by considering whether a given consump-
tion pattern enables the capacity for self-support, stability, and
growth through the control of economic resources that do not
work to disempower others. In this light, the concerns explored
in the previous section constitute reminders, rather than
irrebuttable criticisms, that the dualisms of consumption must
be collapsed.
This kind of self-critical observation is already abundant
in cultural studies, urban theory, and in lawyering"e and law
reform.'87 The uncelebrated difference locked into most social-
ly constructed binaries of racial identity is probably not what
iM Among legal scholars, Gerald Lopez has mounted a comprehensive critique of
lawyering practices in the public interest, which he calls "regnant" and
disempowering of clients. Non-legal professionals who work with the same client
base but are rarely engaged by public interest lawyers "come to appreciate the
fact that huge numbers of lawyers for the subordinated regularly do certain things
and not others, feel comfortable in certain arrangments and not others, talk in
certain ways and not others, and imagine certain possibilities within reach and
not others." GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 26 (1992). See also Janine Young Kim, Note, Are
Asians Black?: The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the Contemporary
Significance of the Black/White Paradigm, 108 YALE L.J. 2385 (1999) (describing
embedded assumptions of the black/white paradigm in civil rights and its problems
and continuing uses for Asian Americans); see generally Elizabeth M. Iglesias &
Francisco Valdes, Afterword-Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in Coali-
tional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice Agen-
das, 19 UCLA CIICANO-LATINO L. REV. 503 (1998).
. See Ford, supra note 168, at 1906-17. See also Georgette Poindexter, Collec-
tive Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 607, 609
(1997). "I propose that we deconstruct the Legal City and view the existence of
the city, in fact all of local government, as a manifestation of revealed choice
based on the collective individualism of its citizens." Id. She defines collective indi-
vidualism as "spatially delineated individual expressions of self that are aggregated
into community definition." Id. Moreover, she argues that Economic, rather than
legal structures such as local government, should predominate in order to develop
legal structures that "validate consumers' individualism and revealed choice by
dissolving legal impediments to the full and free expression of their choice." Id.
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scholars like Taibi advocate when they seek respect for differ-
ence. Nor is within-group disrespect for difference-such as
racial essentialism-consistent with the urban requirement of
more collective identities."' The catalogue of marginalizing
oppressions I describe as the metamarket/antimarket dichot-
omy is itself a dualism in need of dissolution if cities are to
function as heterogeneous sites of empowerment. "In order to
promote the creation of the humane city, rather than the alien-
ating megalopolis, a positive vision of the urban is neces-
Sary-" 189
Returning to culture and urban theory, the urban geogra-
pher Edward Soja acknowledges the general difficulty of this
sort of "de-centering."' 9' "Empowerment from multiplicity,
fragmentation, and disorder is no easy matter, but the pros-
pects for achieving it are much greater in the new cultural
politics than the old."'9' Like West and cultural studies schol-
ars such as bell hooks, 92 Soja sees the economic and political
dynamics separating parts of the city as constituent parts of
the culture of politics.' 9' This convergence allows certain pos-
sibilities for change, which he calls a third alternative over
conventional dualisms, "an Other choice":
The assertion of the Other term disrupts the logical and
epistemological foundations of the binary, promoting a more open,
" See Hall, supra note 181, at 29-30 ("The essentializing moment is weak
because it naturalizes and dehistoricizes difference, mistaking what is historical
and cultural for what is natural, biological, and genetic .... [Als always happens
when we naturalize historical categories (think about gender and sexuality), we fix
that signifier outside of history, outside of change, outside of political interven-
tion.") Thus, even in popular black community culture, some are needlessly exclud-
ed. See also Edward W. Soja, Margin/Alia: Social Justice and the New Culture
Politics, in THE URBANIZATION OF INJUSTICE 180 (Andy Merrifield & Erik
Swyngedouw eds., 1997). Drawing on the work of David Harvey, Soja wrote, "[T]he
new cultural politics seeks social justice through the assertion and preservation of
difference and the maintenance of strategically chosen and non-exclusive individual
and collective identities." Id. at 190.
18 Ford, supra note 168, at 1908.
'9 Soja, supra note 188, at 189.
191 Soja, supra note 188, at 189-90.
" See bell hooks, Postmodern Blackness, in YEARNING: RACE, GENDER AND
CULTURAL POLITICS 30 (1990) (describing how the shared sensibilities of alienation
in society creates a potential for coalition within "a postmodernism of resistance").
" See Soja, supra note 188, at 189 ("[Ihe political power of the economic is
now increasingly cultural in its real and imagined, material and ideological, mani-
festations.").
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flexible, and eclectic 'both/and also... 'search for new possibilities,
different ways of (re)constituting the nature and meaning of the
multitude of binary relations that have so powerfully shaped west-
ern philosophical and political thought: subject-object, material-men-
tal, individual-societal, real-imagined; and, with regard to the cul-
tural politics of class, race, and gender: capital-labour, white-black,
male-female.194
The "both/and also" possibilities of economic empowerment
might recognize, for example, that consistent over-siting in
antimarkets of necessary but undesirable land uses, such as
waste treatment facilities, breathes vitality to neighborhoods
across the city, but increases the incidence of asthma in
antimarkets while depressing the value of developable land
there.'95 Joint consumption no doubt produces the waste, but
low-income areas are disproportionately affected as consumers
by the location of its end-product management. Therefore, such
practices are violative of a legal norm of economic empower-
ment. All communities should care about environmental toxins,
but residents and businesses in antimarkets must advocate
from an empowerment basis that such disproportionate distri-
bution of public services works to marginalize their communi-
ties. In the process of re-figuring local governmental notions of
consumption, they must assertively collapse the dualism that
has historically characterized their communities and not others
as dumping grounds.
Different arguments about what constitutes beneficial
consumption and our relative entitlements to it on the basis of
empowerment could be made for an endless range of
antimarket variables-from the hours and routes of public
transportation service to encouragement of check cashing out-
lets and home equity scams through bank disinvestment. Some
of these will be addressed in Part IV as a brief exploration of
empowerment praxis. But most of these kinds of initiatives
14 See Soja, supra note 188, at 188.
19 There are several established means for making this argument, especially in
the name of environmental justice advocacy. See generally Luke W. Cole, Macho
Law Brains, Public Citizens, and Grassroots Activists: Three Models of Environmen-
tal Advocacy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 687 (1995); Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto:
A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 KAN. L. REV. 271 (1992). The
point here, however, is to wrap such efforts into a comprehensive legal norm
around which neighbors and neighborhoods can rally and thereby participate in
decisionmaking and further the underlying goals of local control and stability.
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take necessary aim at a larger problem of consumerism: the
primacy of the individual and the sanctity of the private
sphere. Because these values are not only consistent with tra-
ditional liberalism but also integral to notions of personal
autonomy, they give rise to a final criticism that only the poor
are expected to subsume their individual needs and preferenc-
es for those of the group.
D. The Unnatural Sacrifice of Individualism vs. the Nature of
Things
Seeking collective identity across neighborhood boundaries
for the sake of empowerment may be a worthy aspiration, but
it is not likely for all of the reasons that make exclusion an
underlying norm of metamarket development and mainte-
nance. Meanwhile, the poor and non-white have been frequent-
ly expected to relinquish self-sovereignty and privacy in order
to promote some greater, often moral, goal--or at least to seek
power by overt identification with a social or racial group. In
the name of empowerment, then, why should the persistently
poor not actualize their needs and preferences through pure
individualism if they want? Doesn't a reformation of low-in-
come consumer priorities reinforce the notion of their subordi-
nation? To this I have three responses.
First, pure individualism is overrated-and philosophically
unsupported, at least as a universal norm.'96 That some com-
munities want or need to opt for modified rules of consumption
and welfare is neither new nor compromising. Indeed, pure
individualism, as much as exclusion, probably creates the con-
dition for antimarkets in the first place by replicating zero-sum
outcomes that direct scarce resources away from certain inter-
ests in favor of others.
Second, by definition antimarkets are different; they are
environments in which economic joinder has been insufficient
"' See Haar, supra note 41, at 1019-20. He wrote:
While zoning remains primarily individualistic, it bears the Aristotelian
idea that justice is found in shared undertaking both for the good of
individuals and the good of the community. The free-rider problem and
the social paradoxes, sharply manifest in metropolitan land, limit the
area for the exercise of unbridled individualism.
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and the constraints are so great as to demand communal orga-
nization. One might argue further that there is a lot of pure
individualism in antimarkets already-and much of it is de-
structive, such as crime.
Third, middle-class metamarkets are not in fact bastions of
pure individualism. As environments, and despite their appar-
ent fealty to liberal organization, the middle class regularly
accepts conditions on their economic freedoms for the commu-
nal good: the social compact. 9 ' Indeed, on a practical level,
middle-class life in America is often a rule-bound life.
IV. Two HYPOTHETICAL EXPERIENCES IN CONSUMER-ORIENTED
ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
The final Part of this Article explores the legal norm of
economic empowerment in legal praxis. Specifically, I discuss
two general and hypothetical means by which lawyers for eco-
nomic empowerment might assist communities in establishing
strategies for development from a consumer orientation. The
first involves questions of direct consumer education and relies
on the concept of beneficial consumption in the public sphere.
The second also seeks the promotion of beneficial consumption,
but through an investment vehicle more related to the private
sphere. Both skeletal strategies are designed mainly to illus-
trate some of the ways in which the foregoing analysis might
effectively join consumption with bona fide, wealth-enhancing
agency, local decisionmaking, and self-support by communities
for the purpose of antimarket transformation. Both strategies
involve what I have called facilitative, rather than adversarial,
lawyering.19
8
A. Public-Regarding: Consumer Education and Organizing
There are competing ideas of what constitutes beneficial
consumption, and it is the character of this competition that
often distinguishes consumerism from empowerment-oriented
1? See Haar, supra note 41, at 1019-20; see also EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA
HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT
145-49 (1994) (describing how since their beginning, common interest development
restrictions reverse Lockean beliefs in property ownership and citizenship).
'9 See Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy, supra note 2, at 490-505.
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consumption. Three examples may clarify important differenc-
es: the "big box border war," a city-suburb public services dis-
parity and, most importantly, an intra-city exchange of impov-
erished services for the poor. Before they are set out, imagine
the role of lawyers as convening with an emerging community-
based organization I will call The Empowerment Center
("TEC"), which is chartered to educate antimarket consumers
and to advocate with them on a variety of "consumer" mat-
ters." Obviously, the first issue is to convey to low-income
residents that they are indeed consumers of the services below.
I will save for the third example a fuller discussion of how the
advocacy issues might be joined.
First, in the example of the big box border war, an inner-
ring suburb facing rising levels of low-income families and a
declining tax base woos a big-box retail development to the
city's borders."0 Low-income consumers and workers in the
town believe its arrival would be a good thing. This is a devel-
opment designed for pure consumption; the store will attract
others, consumers (from that city and its neighbors) will meet
their shopping needs more cheaply and easily, and the store
will contribute sales and property tax revenues and, most
importantly, create jobs. However, it will also create more traf-
fic on nearby expressways shared by other, more affluent sub-
urbs, which do not want big-box superstores. They are consum-
ers of a quieter life and the "blessings of quiet seclusion,"20
1
whose consumption will be diminished, they believe, by the
nearby encroachment of mega-retail and accompanying traffic.
Here the "rights" of the less-affluent suburb ought to be se-
'" I am aware of the gross oversimplification of relying upon a single organiza-
tion--community based or otherwise-to work with consumers. The structure of
legal and social services in antimarket neighborhoods is often far more complex
and extensive than that. Suffice it to say, then, that TEC merely represents a
species of organization that might be dedicated to these kinds of interventions,
though in practice these efforts would likely be coordinated among similar kinds of
groups.
200 This hypothetical is based loosely on a similar dispute developing among
Westchester County suburbs of New York City. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Affluent
Town Seeks to Curb Development Outside Its Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2000,
at BI.
201 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
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cured by home rule and other land use law to develop what
they want, the way they want. How is this a matter of econom-
ic empowerment?
Rather than waiting to see how the home rule fight is
resolved between dueling municipal administrations, The Em-
powerment Center might first assemble residents in meetings
to discuss exactly how their needs as individual consumers
may coalesce with the collective consumption needs of their
strapped municipality."2 This is indeed the exercise of home
rule rather than its theory. Local citizen participation in this
process-among previously uninvolved residents-may not only
strengthen the municipality's hand relative to its affluent
neighbor but also produce public comment about the actual
benefits of the project, information about the allocations of in-
creased tax revenues, and perhaps, result in some modifica-
tions to or exactions from the store itself. Here the empower-
ment dimensions of TEC's information and advocacy work re-
flect disclosure and awareness of the costs and benefits of
retail development, the self-agency of citizen participation and
local control over project scope, as well as the community
wealth-enhancing features of the larger project.0 3
The second example involves public services disparities
within one city, yet affecting suburban interests outside its
borders." 4 City residents of poor neighborhoods use the same
mass transit trains to get to work as suburban riders, but the
fares for shorter rides within the city are actually more expen-
sive than those for longer rides to the wealthier areas (in part
202 Briffault reminds us that, as for competition among cities and economic
development, the policy goals of municipalities have been to retain businesses,
bring in new investment and encourage gentrification, rather than to empower
low-income consumers. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 411. A related aspect is the
unequal bargaining power in siting decisions, which, even in the suburbs, is some-
times substantial, therefore implicating issues of eminent domain and the process
of designating certain areas and not others as "blighted." See Debra West, IKEA
Wants to Move In, but Neighbors Fight Moving Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2000, at
B1.
20 That the affluent suburban neighbors feel slighted is unfortunate but not
dispositive. Consumerist control over the economic life of communities across bor-
ders they ordinarily benefit from simply reflects excessive regional power.
2' This hypothetical is based on Randy Kennedy, Survey Finds Disparities in
Train Service, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at B5 (describing results of New York
City Public Advocate survey that documents gross disparities suffered by urban
users of the Long Island Railroad and Metro-North).
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because of special discounts that are offered weekly to "commu-
ters"). Moreover, service is less frequent to some inner-city
stops. Is a consumer-based petition by and on behalf of the
inner-city residents against the transit company empowering?
Ordinarily, municipal services disparities occupy lawyers in
difficult litigation strategies,205 but TEC's reliance here on a
consumer petition drive could disclose to riders some economic
dimensions of metropolitan service delivery. Moreover, the fare
differentials at issue bring to the fore more than equality prin-
ciples, but also substantive unconscionability and unfairness
principles in relative context. Finally, public transportation
matters are, by definition, economic access issues with impor-
tant implications for employment and related household wel-
fare.
The last example demonstrates the tenuous link between
relevant consumers and a quasi-contractual relationship to
government-provided goods and services. The poorest neigh-
borhoods in the city are comprised of families disproportion-
ately represented in the child welfare services administration,
a city agency.26 That is, they are the direct "beneficiaries" of
2" See Dubin, supra note 30, at 779-82; Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy, supra note
2, at 496-500. See also Ammons v. Dade City, Fla., 594 F. Supp. 1274 (M.D. Fla.
1984); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) (rec-
ognizing that 98% of homes fronting on unpaved streets were occupied by blacks,
97% of homes not served by sanitary sewers were in black neighborhoods, all
high-powered mercury vapor street lighting was installed in white neighborhoods,
and most of the white occupied homes were served by 6 inch water mains where-
as 63% of the black occupied homes were served by either 4 inch, 2 inch, or 1 1/4
inch water mains); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, Fla., 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla.
1978) (finding that black Arcadia residents were three and a half times more
likely than white residents to live in a house fronting on unpaved streets due to
policy that designated dead-end streets as lowest paving priority while more blacks
lived on dead-end streets, park and recreation facilities in black neighborhods were
far inferior to facilities in white neighborhoods, and black neighborhoods contained
a water delivery system inadequate to deliver proper water pressure due to small
diameter pipe); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
929 (2d Cir. 1988) (zoning regulation that restricted private multi-family housing
to minority "urban renewal area" resulted in shortage of affordable rental housing
for low- and moderate-income households which impacted blacks three times more
than the overall population); City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S.
462 (1987) (noting that city annexed new territory in such a manner as to annex
only white-occupied land while excluding adjacent black community so as to per-
petuate city's all-white voting population). See also Dowdell v. City of Apopka,
Fla., 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983).
2C This hypothetical is based loosely on Somini Sengupta, Bleak Assessment
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its federal, state, and local taxpayer-funded services. As a re-
sult, they consume (at no charge) the representation of private
and public social workers (paid with public funds) and the
decisions of family court judges. Their involvement often has
life-altering implications, such as foster care placements divid-
ing families or domestic violence determinations and relocation
directives. However, the system poorly trains its social work-
ers, who are not only representatives sometimes unaware of
their "clients'" particular circumstances or unprepared for
hearing appearances, but are also essential gatekeepers of
family composition. A commissioned report based on reviews of
caseworkers' representation and placement histories finds that
a great percentage of caseworkers are incompetent." 7 Fur-
ther, family court judges are afraid not to defer to the incom-
petent caseworkers' decisions, thus giving poor decisions the
often permanent stamp of law.
Legal advocates for foster children and families have en-
gaged in numerous litigation strategies against city foster care
agencies."' As important as some of these cases have been to
reform efforts, few directly empower low-income consumers,
who, in these matters, are children (and families). Lawyers
working with TEC for community economic empowerment
would first have to establish consumer status among the many
families in antimarket neighborhoods affected by child welfare
rules. That is, they must assist children and families accus-
tomed to thinking about the child care bureaucracy as a power-
ful, alienating, indifferent bureaucracy with whom they have
struck only an accidental bargain to re-conceive it as a service
Offered on City's Child Welfare System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at B3 (describ-
ing findings reported by the Special Child Welfare Advisory Panel, such as "a
child coming in contact with this system cannot count on being assigned a case-
worker who has received enough training to be properly prepared for the complex
work that she is expected to do").
201 The reasons many caseworkers in large social welfare systems are unpre-
pared are complicated, and I do not mean this example as a critique on the pro-
fession or its standards.
20 See Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981)
(Section 1983 suit against city for deliberate indifference in foster care cases);
United States ex rel. Graber v. City of New York, 8 F. Supp. 2d 343 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (Federal False Claims Act against New York City for filing falsified case-
worker reports of children in foster care); Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stipulation and settlement in 20-year Section 1983 case challeng-
ing New York State's statutory scheme for the provision of foster care placements).
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provider obligated to act pursuant to the children and families'
legally defined interests.29 This is undoubtedly difficult; most
families in foster care are already weakened by crisis, and
many children in need of placement outside the home are fur-
ther silenced by minority status. However, some of these weak-
nesses are compounded by administrative mistreatment with
further disempowering (and sometimes irrevocable) effects. The
marginalizing impact of official mistreatment may include
permanent family dislocation, the potential for abuse, educa-
tional transiency, and predisposition to criminaility. The collec-
tive effects on the communities from which these families come
are incalculable.
But like public education and transportation, these too are
city services, and, like those services, middle-class consumers
regularly empower themselves through demands for disclosure
of system rules and allocable benefits. Here, the absence of
knowledge about caseworker competency requirements, place-
ment options and specific processes for family reunification
(where appropriate) may be remedied, in part, by much greater
consumer education about lawful and effective state interven-
tions. This triggers the disclosure and access inquiries of the
empowerment norm.
Although the precise steps TEC and its lawyers might
take toward empowerment in this complicated field are beyond
this analysis, the unfairness in failing to accommodate
antimarket consumers of foster care services presents the pros-
pect of substantial and unavoidable consumer injury, further
destabilizing families with mistaken agency decisionmaking
and depositing into ghettoes more individuals who have at an
early age assimilated a diminished capacity for personal agen-
cy and self-support.210 Therefore, TEC might work with "at-
2 For purposes of this hypothetical analysis, I accept current interpretations of
the best-interests-of-the-child standard, despite evidence in this scenario of possible
judicial neglect.
210 In New York City, as one example of big city foster care caseloads, studies
indicate that about 1,200 adolescents leave the foster care system and are released
into poor neighborhoods with little or no job skills, education, or financial resourc-
es, despite early lives in sometimes crack-addicted parental situations and frequent
movement in and out of different foster care youth homes. See Somini Sengupta,
Youths Leaving Foster Care System With Few Skills or Resources; Risks of
Homelessness and Jail Are Great, Studies Suggest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2000, at
Al.
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risk" families and the children themselves to demand detailed
information about foster care rights and entitlements at the
point of entry, petition for public hearings in which affected
consumers may voice their interests concerning rule changes,
and propose the requirement of heightened support services
and accountability structures for both children and families.
B. Private-Regarding: "The Community Unit
Investment Trust"
If economic empowerment includes the protected control
and ownership of resources that enable self-support, then like
most of us, antimarket consumers must find ways to accumu-
late wealth. However, antimarkets are not typical sites of
wealth creation; given the acute dearth of banks-and the
profound antipathy with which many antimarket consumers
perceive them-antimarkets are not typical sites even of basic
savings accounts.21' The problem for antimarket consumers
clearly goes beyond lack of income. A great many low-income
consumers spend considerable sums of cash purchasing lottery
tickets-by some estimates, an average of more than $10 per
week.212 And although individual resources may seem mea-
ger, aggregate low-income consumer spending power-at least
for retail items-is not insubstantial. 3 Empowerment zone
211 See, e.g., Troutt, Poor Pay More, supra note 29, at 66 (describing experiences
of low-income banking consumers and barriers to access).
21 See, e.g., Charles T. Clotfelter et al., The Unseemly 'Hard Sell' of Lotteries,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1987, at A27 (using survey data from one state, the authors,
Duke Univ. public policy professors, found that 15% of adults in low-income house-
holds spend $10 or more a week on the lottery); see also Brett Pulley, Waiting For
Riches: A Special Report; Living Off the Daily Dream Of Winning a Lottery Prize,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1999, at Al (using New Jersey State lottery data and zip
code data, the Times' study found that "people living in the 100 lowest average-
income ZIP codes in New Jersey spent $53 per $10,000 of their earnings [on in-
stant-win tickets]. But in the 100 ZIP codes with the highest-average income,
spending on instant-win tickets was just $12 per $10,000.").
21 See, e.g., Troutt, Poor Pay More, supra note 29, at 29 (favorably comparing
aggregate disposable income for consumers in Oakland, California's low-income
neighborhoods with those in middle-income areas); Michael E. Porter, The Competi-
tive Advantage of the Inner City, 73 HARv. Bus. REv. 3, 58-59 (1995) (demonstrat-
ing substantial disposable income in low-income areas). See also Mark Alpert, The
Ghetto's Hidden Wealth, FORTUNE, July 29, 1991, at 167 (reporting that inner city
markets are underserved as to both variety and quality of stores because of mis-
conceptions about income levels of community).
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legislation is premised in part on the assumption that stores
and businesses encouraged to enter low-income neighborhoods
will succeed (with some help) by tapping unmet consumer
need. The wealth created by such arrangements, however, is
only indirectly community based, if at all. Area shoppers may
enjoy the greater convenience and certainty of buying brand-
name items closer to home, yet they build no assets by doing
so. But what if they could?
In our hypothetical inner-city neighborhood, outside inves-
tors have slowly begun to open retail chain stores both in rec-
ognition of untapped consumer markets and in response to
governmental incentives (e.g., revised equipment depreciation
rules and payroll and sales tax abatements connected with
state and federal redevelopment initiatives). Specifically, four
publically traded retailers of clothing, music, hardware, and
beverages as well as two services-oriented public companies, a
large movie theater, and a health club, have relocated to the
area, as well as a major bank. Although they take some advan-
tage of the government incentives, each claims that their mar-
ginally profitable presence is motivated more by increased good
will (locally and globally) and the future gentrification" of the
area. Local consumers generally favor the new businesses as
centers of low-paying job creation and availiability of brand-
name goods and services at affordable prices.
So far, this scenario represents economic development, but
not community economic empowerment. The deals that facili-
tated the location of each store were made with city officials
without significant citizen input. Infrastructure improvements
were made by the city as concessions to the public companies
and primarily at their direction, with little comprehensive
planning input by local officials or community-based organiza-
tions. There is no provision for direct benefit to the community,
even in capturing tax revenues. Local merchants' concerns
about unfair competition (e.g., they receive no tax incentives
for continuing their businesses) were overridden. Thus, the
portrait of community change is mixed, but clearly portends
the possibility of gentrification (as commercial rents increase
along with residential rents and property values) and displace-
ment of poorer, unrepresented residents seems certain on some
scale.
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What if income-eligible residents could become sharehold-
ers in the success or failure of the redevelopment
initiative?214 Lawyers working in connection with TEC and
perhaps an established community development financial insti-
tution ("CDFI") propose a special investment opportunity only
available to income-eligible residents of the area (a geographi-
cally defined "zone").215 These low-income consumers are in-
vited to buy reduced-cost shares in a financial investment
opportunity modeled after a unit investment trust ("UIT). 2 6
"A UIT is an unmanaged investment vehicle that invests in
securities and sells interests ('units') in itself."2 7 Shares in a
periodically fixed portfolio of the same publicly-traded compa-
nies doing retail business in our hypothetical redevelopment
zone would be sold to qualified investors on comparatively flex-
ible terms.
In the "unit" or "fixed" investment trusts there is no obligation to
pay any specified amount. Typically the holder of a share in such a
trust has merely an undivided interest in a package of specified
securities that are held by a trustee or custodian. There is no board
of directors, and management discretion in the management of the
portfolio is entirely eliminated or reduced to a minimum. Indeed, the
trust's sole asset is almost always the share of a single open-ended
investment company, and the unit investment trust issues 'periodic
payment plan certificates' that represent the indirect interest of its
investors in the shares of the underlying investment company.218
214 Beyond empowerment zones and related types of government-initiated rede-
velopment projects, compare Michael Porter's detailed proposals for competitive
advantage business clustering in overlooked ghettoes in The Competitive Advantage
of the Inner City, supra note 213.
215 Nothing prevents these ideas from traveling. Even if pilot versions of such a
plan were locally restricted-focusing, for example, on some of the ten current
federal empowerment zones-the trust itself could be opened to other income-eligi-
ble consumers in antimarket communities across the country. Expansion would
simply expand trust administration.
216 The ensuing analysis of UITs and their specific treatment under the federal
securities laws is admittedly skeletal. A more in-depth review is simply beyond the
scope of this hypothetical and this Article as a whole. I also acknowledge other
financial vehicles that may have an equal or greater value as a model for commu-
nity wealth accumulation, but offer this one as a framework with some precedent.
21 Thomas S. Harman, Emerging Alternatives to Mutual Funds: Unit Investment
Trusts and Other Fixed Portfolio Investment Vehicles, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1046.
218 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURfTIES REGULATION,
1H.6.a.(ii) (1995).
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The legal advantages of what we might call the Communi-
ty Unit Investment Trust ("CUIT") are substantial. While pro-
viding low-risk, low-cost, fully redeemable investments,21 the
CUIT would require minimal administrative responsibility and
expense because of its relaxed oversight requirements under
federal securities laws" and, unlike mutual funds, the iden-
tity of the companies whose shares are traded within it can be
relatively static.22' The UIT form might also allow for a shar-
ing of supervisory responsibilities between, for example, a
bank trustee (perhaps the major bank that has relocated to the
neighborhood) and a community-based trustee, such as TEC or
the local CDFI.22' In any event, legal disclosure and manage-
ment requirements fall under the securities laws, thus ensur-
ing a greater measure of protection against fraud to investor-
consumers." Finally, the inherent need for transactional le-
gal assistance from lawyers not customarily involved in com-
munity development work (as well as other securities profes-
sionals) might further link isolated antimarket consumers and
their financial concerns with their metamarket counterparts
and professionals in more affluent parts of town.
The CUIT's empowerment benefits to antimarket consum-
ers are also formidable.' While frequently expending scarce
219 According to Harman, supra note 217, at 1046, "UITs are attractive invest-
ments because they offer liquidity and diversity at an affordable price. They allow
investors of even moderate means to own an interest in a pool of diversified secu-
rities and, because they issue redeemable securities, they allow investors to liqui-
date their investments quickly and avoid many of the markets vagaries."
"o This is true under both the applicable provisions of the 1933 and 1940 Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission Acts. See, for example, registration and disclosure
requirements at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3, a-4(2), a-24 (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 270.30a-1
(2000); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(a) and (c), 77j(a)(3) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.485 (2000),
some of which have undergone modification by the Commission since interest in
UITs was rekindled in the 1980s.
'21 Harman, supra note 217, at 1047.
22 Although UITs generally require a custodial trustee (often the same as the
sponsor), a depositor and an evaluator (of share values), there appears no reason
that a bank sponsor could not act as co-trustee along with a CDFI. See id. Indeed,
for the idea to work, such a locally trusted and know intermediary may be an
important feature for many antimarket consumers skeptical of banks.
' The more onerous disclosure requirements to which mutual funds are obli-
gated may arguably offer greater protections to securities consumers. However,
under C.F.R. § 270.30d-2, UITs that invest most of their shares in one manage-
ment company (as CUIT presumably would) must provide regular reports to share-
holders.
" The benefits to businesses operating in or near these areas should also be
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dollars on wealth-enhancing hopes such as lottery tickets, low-
income people watch the same barrage of do-it-yourself
Internet stock trading advertising that all Americans see on
TV. These ads for financial self-empowerment undoubtedly
compound many other daily messages distinguishing the access
enjoyed by middle-class households from poorer ones in our
consumer culture. The CUIT, in addition to its basic financial
disclosure norms, may first empower antimarket consumers
with a heightened sense of economic access. If through the
assistance of consumer education intermediaries such as TEC
low-income investors can come to trust banking and invest-
ment institutions, many may develop the same interest in and
vigilance for securities investments that the lottery currently
holds. Obviously, empowerment here invokes additional norms
of access to wealth production and remediation even in the
way investment products and redevelopment projects are de-
signed. Yet equally important to the success of the CUIT hypo-
thetical is accommodation to the scant savings histories and
the terrifying (if not degrading) institutional experiences many
low-income consumers have had with mainstream finance.
Finally, if wealth enhancement is to promote empowerment
along the lines described in this Article, antimarket consumers
must truly feel protected in their ownership of economic re-
sources, which means designing instruments that provide the
same assurances of control that metamarket consumers rightly
expect.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have attempted to build upon the founda-
tional dichotomy separating metamarket from antimarket
communities in order to develop a consumer-oriented legal
norm of economic empowerment. The analysis emphasized
three critical distinctions along the way: metamarket versus
antimarket consumption patterns, established consumer law
recognized. Although my portrayal of corporate interests here is somewhat cynical
(at least regarding their companies' motivations for locating in inner-city neighbor-
hoods), many companies with a presence in antimarkets value the local goodwill it
generates. Many others would like to participate. The UIT provides a corporate
avenue for corporations interested in developing relationships with low-income
consumers.
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protections versus empowerment norms, and self-interested
consumerism versus beneficial consumption. A legal norm of
empowerment, I have argued, is a condition of agency capable
of bringing about self-support, stability, and growth through
the protected control and ownership of economic resources. The
necessarily implied protections, such as disclosure, equality,
and fairness, are evident in our consumer laws, but require the
addition of access, remediation, and acommodation. Even then,
the legal norm risks being consumed by consumerism. That is,
empowerment as a legally recognized idea premised on princi-
ples of consumption may, in an increasingly consumerized
culture, be subverted to disempowering ends. The fine line we
walk, therefore, requires a collapsing of dangerous dualisms
and vigilant consumer education in ways I have tried
hypthetically to illustrate.
Community economic empowerment is as potentially large
a field of legal theory and praxis as any set of structures con-
figuring American community life in the United States. Under-
lying analyses such as these are real people and neighborhoods
struggling for survival in often unspeakable isolation. Much of
my analysis has attempted to highlight the legal mechanisms
by which middle-class and low-income sensibilities may be
bridged for the primary benefit of marginalized consumers but
also for the secondary benefit of metropolitan communities
linked in more ways than are sometimes imagined. However,
these are only legal mechanisms and, like this analysis itself,
contain within them obvious and inherent limitations in their
ability to see more compassionately into very difficult lives and
circumstances. This is but one more attempt in a series of
ongoing efforts, spurred, I hope, by a recognized need for trans-
formation along some third way.

